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GETTING OUR ACT TOGETHER: A REVIEW OF THE CANADIAN DERIVATIVES
REGULATORY LANDSCAPE AND AN ARGUMENT FOR A DEDICATED
DERIVATIVES REGIME
R. Aaron Libbey*

INTRODUCTION

The   volume   of   derivatives   in   the   global   ﬁnancial   system   has   exploded.      Before   the  
1980s,  these  products  were  virtually  unknown.    As  of  June  2009,  the  notional  market  
value  of  outstanding  derivatives  was  in  excess  of  USD  $600  trillion.1 Regulators have
been slow to act to date – and where they have acted, the legal, systemic and opera-‐‑
tional  risks  associated  with  derivative  ﬁnancial  products  have  not  always  been  prop-‐‑
erly determined or resolved.2
This paper explores the Canadian approach to derivatives regulation, examining its
strengths  and  weaknesses,  and  looking  at  improvements  that  could  be  made.    I  argue  
that the outdated, disorganized and decentralized maze of laws that regulate Canada’s
markets  is  both  ineﬃcient  and  ineﬀective.    In  light  of  the  challenges  posed  by  the  rap-‐‑
idly   evolving   derivatives   markets   and   the   increasingly   global   economy,   the   current  
system is no longer tenable, and a reshaping of the regulatory scheme is necessary. A
modern,  consolidated,  principles-‐‑based  regulatory  system  will  be er  serve  investors  
*

     R.  Aaron  Libbey,  B.A.H.,  J.D.  (Queen’s  University),  is  currently  a  student-‐‑at-‐‑law  at  Goodmans  
LLP in Toronto, Ontario. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not repre-‐‑
sent  the  views  of  the  ﬁrm.
1     “Semiannual  OTC  derivatives  statistics  at  end-‐‑June  2009,”  (June  2009),  online:  The  Bank  for  
International  Se lements  <h p://www.bis.org/statistics/derstats.htm>  at  tables  19  and  20A.  See  also  
Martin Marcone, Eligible Financial Contracts: A Legal Analysis (Markham:  LexisNexis  Canada  Inc.,  
2009)  at  2;  and  Niall  Ferguson,  The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World  (New  York:  the  
Penguin  Group,  2008)  at  4.
2     Janis  Sarra,  “Dancing  the  Deux  Pas,  The  Financial  Crisis  and  Lessons  for  Corporate  Governance”  
(2009)  32  U.N.S.W.L.J.  447  at  465-‐‑468.  See  also  Richard  B.  Jones,  “Credit  Derivatives,  Issues  for  
Insolvency Restructurings” in Janis P. Sarra, ed., Annual Review of Insolvency Law, 008 (Toronto:
Thomson  Carswell,  2009)  at  271-‐‑277.
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and  businesses,  and  will  be  a  more  eﬀective  guardian  of  the  health  of  the  Canadian  
economy.    The  ﬁrst  section  of  this  paper  explores  the  ﬁne  balance  that  must  be  achieved  
between  the  regulation  of  derivatives  markets  and  the  need  to  allow  participants  the  
freedom  to  transact  and  obtain  the  full  economic  beneﬁt  from  derivative  instruments.    
Section  II  looks  into  the  Canadian  experience  with  derivatives  regulation,  examining  
the sources of ambiguity, the varying provincial regimes, and the problems that have
arisen with regulation. Section III suggests a way forward out of the confusion of the
current  Canadian  regulatory  system.    I  propose  a  Québec-‐‑style  dedicated  piece  of  leg-‐‑
islation,  with  a  principles-‐‑based  approach,  rooted  in  an  ideology  of  the  markets  that  
takes   into   account   the   dangers   of   unchecked   participants,   and   that   is   overseen   by   a  
national  regulator  as  a  part  of  a  comprehensive  ﬁnancial  regulation  system.
Before   exploring   the   Canadian   regulatory   framework   applicable   to   derivatives   it   is  
necessary  to  describe  what  the  term  “derivatives”  refers  to  and  the  nature  of  the  mar-‐‑
kets  within  which  these  ﬁnancial  instruments  are  used.

1. Defining the Term “Derivatives”
The  realm  of  derivative  ﬁnancial  products  is  commonly  painted  as  arcane,  but  the  con-‐‑
cept  that  forms  the  foundation  of  derivatives  markets  is  well  understood:  the  holder  
of a particular right at contract is entitled to receive some form of payment or asset
upon the exercise of that right, which itself has a distinct value.3 At the most basic
level,  derivatives  are  contracts  or  investment  tools  with  values  linked  to,  or  derived  
from, the performance of some underlying reference item. Arriving at a more precise
deﬁnition  can  be  diﬃcult  as,  aside  from  sharing  the  quality  of  having  derived  value,  
the  array  of  ﬁnancial  instruments  grouped  under  the  “derivatives”  genus  in  economic  
nomenclature   display   very   diﬀerent   characteristics   from   one   another.4 There are a
seemingly  unlimited  number  of  structures  that  parties  may  use  to  deﬁne  their  rights  
and  obligations  under  derivative  ﬁnancial  contracts;  they  may  be  exchange-‐‑traded  or  
traded  over-‐‑the-‐‑counter  (OTC),  used  for  risk-‐‑management  or  speculation,  and  can  be  
dependent on practically any variable.5 Underlying variables commonly used include
assets,  indices  or  ﬁnancial  indicators.    However,  subjects  as  unlikely  as  the  weather,  
internet  bandwidth  or  snow  conditions  on  ski  resorts  may  also  be  used  as  underlying  
reference items.6
While   exchange-‐‑traded   derivatives   fall   under   a   variety   of   regulatory   umbrellas,   in-‐‑
cluding the rules of the exchanges and occasionally securities regulation regimes, as
will  be  discussed  below  OTC  derivatives  o en  escape  regulation  as  they  are  essentially  
private contracts. It should be noted that while the discussion in this paper covers both
exchange-‐‑traded  and  OTC  derivatives,  the  observations  and  prescriptions  herein  most  
signiﬁcantly  relate  to  and  impact  the  OTC  derivatives  markets.  
3    
4    
5    
6    

Alastair  Hudson,  The Law of Financial Derivatives,  4th  ed.  (Toronto:  Carswell,  2006)  at  13.
Ibid.  at  13-‐‑15.
John  C.  Hull,  Options,  futures  and  Other  Derivatives,  5th  Ed.  (New  Jersey:  Prentice  Hall,  2003)  at  1.
Marcone,  supra  note  1  at  67.
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Derivatives  have  two  primary  uses:  to  earn  income  by  using  risk  capital  to  speculate  
on  ﬂuctuations  in  a  particular  market,  and  as  a  form  of  insurance  used  to  protect  in-‐‑
vestment decisions by hedging against unfavourable movements in the price, rates
or values of an underlying item.7 Derivative products are increasingly used by busi-‐‑
nesses  to  manage  risk  in  an  economic  environment  characterized  by  uncertainties  and  
sharp  ﬂuctuations  in  interest  rates,  foreign  exchange  markets  and  commodity  prices.    
While  there  are  a  number  of  ways  to  manage  ﬁnancial  risks  without  using  derivatives,  
such  as  by  a empting  to  forecast  market  movements,  borrowing  money  at  a  ﬁxed  in-‐‑
terest rate, or moving production to the same country as that of one’s competitors,
these  strategies  are  o en  costly  and  undesirably  rigid.8    Moreover,  while  a  diversiﬁed  
investment  portfolio  can  nearly  eliminate  risks  endemic  to  a  particular  company  –  as  
factors  that  negatively  impact  the  company’s  returns  can  be  oﬀset  by  general  market  
trends  –  system-‐‑wide  risks,  including  ﬂuctuations  in  interest  rates  that  aﬀect  the  entire  
market,   cannot   be   eliminated   through   diversiﬁcation.9      Derivatives   oﬀer   a   tailored,  
ﬂexible,   and   o en   more   eﬀective   alternative   for   hedging   against   both   systemic   and  
un-‐‑systemic  risks.    Through  derivative  products,  entities  are  able  to  manage  the  risks  
associated  with  market  ﬂuctuations  and  inject  certainty  into  their  operations.    For  ex-‐‑
ample, to counteract a potential loss that may be incurred as a result of the movement
in  valuation  of  some  underlying  asset  or  obligation,  an  entity  will  o en  enter  into  a  
derivative  contract  establishing  an  entitlement  to  receive  a  deﬁned  cash  ﬂow  over  a  
period of time.10
Similarly, derivatives enable speculation by providing a means through which a party
can  suppose  that  some  notional  investment  is  made  in  the  market  for  a  particular  un-‐‑
derlying item and receive a return on that notional amount, in excess of its actual ex-‐‑
posure  to  risk.11 In addition, leveraging features can be added to multiply the impact
of the movement of the underlying rate or index.

2. The Basic Mechanics of Derivatives
While   the   broad   deﬁnition   of   derivatives   oﬀered   above   is   accurate,   it   is   admi edly  
not particularly useful. Reviewing the particular characteristics and purposes of these
ﬁnancial  instruments  will  provide  a  more  nuanced  and  valuable  illustration  of  how  
they operate and how they are regulated. Despite being limited in variety only by the
imagination  of  ﬁnancial  engineers,  derivatives  are  nonetheless  classiﬁable.    At  a  basic  
level, derivative instruments may be categorized either as forwards, futures, swaps,

7     Brent  W.  Kraus,  “The  Use  and  Regulation  of  Derivative  Financial  Products  in  Canada”  (1999)  9  
W.RL.S.I.  31  at  37–39.  See  also  Margaret  E.  Gro enthaler  &  Philip  J.  Henderson,  The Law of Financial
Derivatives in Canada,  looseleaf  (Toronto:  Thomson  Canada  Limited,  2003)  at  1-‐‑8.
8
Ibid.
9
Kraus, supra  note  7  at  37  and  38.
10 Hudson, supra  note  3  at  14-‐‑15.
11 Ibid. at 15.
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options, or some combination thereof.12
Forwards are generally simple derivative contract structures. They are essentially
agreements  that  mandate  the  sale  or  purchase  of  an  underlying  asset  at  a  speciﬁc  price  
from  another  party  on  a  given  “delivery  date”  in  the  future.13 The items underlying
these derivatives are typically commodities, agricultural products, equities, currencies
and interest rates. The parties to forwards vary the terms of these contracts to suit their
needs,  with  the  vendor  assuming  what  is  commonly  referred  to  as  the  “short”  posi-‐‑
tion  and  the  purchaser  assuming  the  “long”  position.14 Neither money nor goods are
exchanged  at  the  time  a  forward  contract  is  established  –  forward  contracts  are  se led  
on  the  delivery  date  and  as  such  only  assume  value  when  the  market  value  of  an  asset  
ﬂuctuates  from  its  original  position.    If  the  price  goes  up,  the  long  position  assumes  the  
value  of  the  diﬀerence  between  the  market  price  and  the  benchmark,  or  “strike”  price.    
If  the  price  goes  down,  the  short  position  assumes  the  value  of  that  diﬀerence.    Thus,  
the value of a forward contract changes roughly in proportion to the change in value
of the underlying asset.15      Owners   of   assets   o en   use   forward   contracts,   either   long  
or  short,  to  hedge  against  price  ﬂuctuation.    This  practice  does  not  increase  an  invest-‐‑
ment’s  return,  but  rather  allows  the  asset  owner  to  secure  a  speciﬁc  price  outcome  in  a  
variable  market.16    The  risk  of  price  ﬂuctuation  is  thus  shi ed  to  investors  who  seek  to  
gain  proﬁt  by  speculating  on  the  direction  of  price  changes.
A  futures  contract  is  essentially  a  forward  that  is  exchange-‐‑traded.    Whereas  forward  
contracts  are  tailored  to  the  speciﬁc  needs  of  the  transacting  parties,  o en  making  it  
diﬃcult  or  expensive  to  ﬁnd  a  party  willing  to  assume  the  other  side  of  the  contract,  
futures contracts are standardized and thus more readily transferable.17 As a result of
this  standardization,  the  futures  market  is  relatively  liquid.    Hence,  physical  delivery  of  
the  underlying  asset  is  not  necessarily  required  in  futures  contracts,  as  there  are  suﬃ-‐‑
cient  market  participants  that  a  contract  may  be  closed  out  by  engaging  in  an  oﬀse ing  
transaction.18    Futures  exchanges  require  parties  to  post  margins  and  se le  accounts  
daily. Moreover, the performance of futures is guaranteed by a clearinghouse, which
is interposed by the exchange between the buyer and the seller, lowering the nonper-‐‑
formance  risk  of  futures  contracts  by  ensuring  that  a  contracting  party  is  not  harmed  
12 There are a variety of opinions regarding which of these instruments constitute the fundamental
elements of derivative instruments. The most popular opinion is that forwards and options are the
building  blocks  of  most  derivatives;  see  Gro enthaler  &  Henderson,  supra  note  7  at  1-‐‑4.  Others  argue  
that options alone are the basis upon which all other derivative forms are created or that it is some
combination of options and forwards and swaps. While this debate is important, it is not relevant for
the purposes of this paper, as understanding these structures is useful notwithstanding the outcome.
For a variety of opinions see for example: Hudson, supra  note  3  at  15;  Marc  Levinson,  Guide to the
Financial Markets  (Economist  Intelligence  Unit,  2005)  at  199;  and  Kraus,  supra  note  7  at  40.
13     Roberta  Romano,  “A  Thumbnail  Sketch  of  Derivative  Securities  and  Their  Regulation”  (1996)  55  
Md. L. Rev. 1 at 10.
14   Kraus, supra  note  7  at  39.
15    Gro enthaler  &  Henderson,  supra  note  7  at  1-‐‑5.
16   Romano, supra  note  13  at  9.
17 Ibid. at 10.
18    For  example,  the  party  that  initially  took  the  short  position  would  buy  a  contract.
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by  the  failure  of  its  counterparty  to  fulﬁll  the  contract.19 These characteristics lower the
credit  risk  proﬁle  of  futures  contracts,  as  compared  with  forwards  or  swaps.20
Options  are  similar  to  forwards,  except  that  the  purchaser  of  an  option  (the  “option  
holder”) has the right  to  purchase  or  sell  the  underlying  asset  at  a  speciﬁed  price  either  
on  or  before  a  speciﬁed  date,  rather  than  the  obligation to do so. An option to buy an
underlying  asset  is  commonly  referred  to  as  a  “call”  option,  and  an  option  to  sell  an  
asset  is  termed  a  “put”.    Unlike  in  forward  contracts,  the  option  holder  makes  a  pay-‐‑
ment  (the  “option  premium”)  at  the  time  the  contract  is  entered  into  in  order  to  receive  
this  right.    It  follows  that  the  vendor  of  the  option  (the  “option  writer”)  is  locked  into  
performing if the option holder decides to exercise its right.
As a result of the asymmetrical structure of options contracts, the maximum gain or
loss on an option is not always aligned between the parties as it is in forward or futures
contracts.    It  will  become  evident  that  this  asymmetry  can  make  it  diﬃcult  to  set  the  
option  premium  to  reﬂect  the  one-‐‑sided  nature  of  the  contract.    The  option  holder’s  
maximum  potential  loss  is  ﬁxed.  As  the  option  holder  is  not  required  to  exercise,  and  
thus will not where a loss would be incurred, the option holder’s loss is limited to the
premium  paid.  Likewise,  the  option  writer’s  maximum  potential  gain  is  limited  to  the  
premium received.
In the context of put options, the parties can similarly be sure that the option writer’s
maximum potential loss and the option holder’s maximum potential gain are theoreti-‐‑
cally equal to the exercise price. As the option holder has the right to sell to the option
writer at the exercise price regardless of the value of the underlying item on the exercise
date,  the  option  holder  will  receive  a  maximum  gain,  and  the  option  writer  will  suﬀer  
a corresponding maximum loss, where the underlying item’s value is zero.21 While the
potential gains and losses can be immense, they are ascertainable to the parties upon
entering the transaction. The same cannot be said of call options. With call options, the
option writer’s maximum potential loss and the option holder’s maximum potential
gain  are  potentially  unlimited,  as  the  diﬀerence  between  exercise  price  and  asset  value  
at the time of exercise is theoretically unlimited.22 A call option holder whose exercise
price  is  below  the  market  price  of  the  underlying  item  is  able  to  reap  the  beneﬁt  of  pur-‐‑
chasing that underlying item at a discount, whereas in such circumstances the option
writer is forced to give up the underlying item at a loss. These losses can be especially
pronounced or damaging where the option writer does not actually own the under-‐‑
lying asset, but instead simply borrowed it for the purposes of the derivative contract.
A swap is a privately negotiated contract that requires the parties to exchange a series
of  calculated  cash  ﬂows  over  a  speciﬁed  time  period,  ending  at  a  deﬁned  maturity  date.    
The  cash  ﬂows  are  determined  by  multiplying  a  notional  principal  amount,  which  typ-‐‑
19
20   
21
22

Romano, supra  note  13  at  17.
Gro enthaler  &  Henderson,  supra  note  7  at  1-‐‑6.
Romano, supra  note  13  at  41.
Ibid.
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ically is not actually exchanged, by the stipulated rate or price behind the swap.23 For
example,  in  the  case  of  a  simple  interest  rate  swap,  one  party  agrees  to  make  ﬁxed  in-‐‑
terest  rate  payments  to  the  counterparty,  who  agrees  to  make  ﬂoating  interest  rate  pay-‐‑
ments  in  return.    The  ﬁxed-‐‑rate  party  will  multiply  the  principal  by  an  interest  rate  the  
parties  have  locked  into,  whereas  the  ﬂoating-‐‑rate  party  will  peg  its  payment  structure  
to  an  interest  rate  such  as  the  London  Interbank  Oﬀered  Rate  (the  “LIBOR”).    Rather  
than each party paying the full value of its respective payment at each interval, only
the   diﬀerential   changes   hands.   There   are   many   variations   on   this   theme,   including  
currency swaps, commodity swaps, equity swaps and the now infamous credit default
swap  –  a  derivative  instrument  through  which  one  party  acquires  the  credit  risk  posed  
by a debt in exchange for a periodic fee.24 Furthermore, the interbreeding of various
derivative  species  has  produced  a  vast  array  of  specialized  ﬁnancial  instruments  with  
an  esoteric  nomenclature.    One  such  example  are  options  on  swaps  –  or  “swaptions”  
–  which  o en  allow  the  holder  of  the  option  to  enter  into  or  exit  from  a  particular  swap  
at a later time, or to leverage his position using a multiplier.
While it would not be possible to canvas all of the potential forms that derivative
products  can  take  in  this  article,  the  preceding  basic  overview  is  intended  to  provide  a  
foundation  suﬃcient  to  frame  a  discussion  on  how  derivatives  have  been  regulated  to  
date,  and  on  what  future  evolutions  might,  or  ought  to,  look  like.

I. REGULATING DERIVATIVES MARKETS – A FINE BALANCE
In   the   spring   of   2003,   former   Federal   Reserve   Chairman   Alan   Greenspan   and   pro-‐‑
liﬁc  investor  Warren  Buﬀe   engaged  in  a  media-‐‑charged  skirmish  that  erupted  over  
a   diﬀerence   of   opinion   on   the   eﬀects   of   derivatives   on   the   global   ﬁnancial   system.25
Buﬀe   warned  that  “[d]erivatives  are  ﬁnancial  weapons  of  mass  destruction,  carrying  
dangers that, while now latent, are potentially lethal.”26 The implosion of Long Term
Capital   Management   (“LCTM”)   in   1998   due   to   fears   of   failed   bets   on   thousands   of  
derivatives  contracts  and  the  collapse  of  ﬁnancial  giants  Lehman  Brothers  Holdings  
Inc.,   Bear   Sterns,   and  American   International   Group   (“AIG”)   are   but   a   few   graphic  
examples of the destructive potential of misused and misunderstood derivatives con-‐‑
tracts.27    Greenspan’s  response  to  Buﬀe   was  that  derivatives  were  instrumental  in  sav-‐‑
ing  a  number  of  major  ﬁnancial  intermediaries  from  the  potentially  lethal  blows  that  
were  dealt  by  a  series  of  catastrophic  defaults.    He  noted  that  “[e]ven  the  largest  cor-‐‑
porate defaults in history (WorldCom and Enron) and the largest sovereign default in
23     Gro enthaler  &  Henderson,  supra  note  7  at  1-‐‑5  and  1-‐‑6.
24     Aaron  Unterman,  “Innovative  Destruction  –  Structured  Finance  and  Credit  Market  Reform  in  
the  Bubble  Era”  (2009)  5  Hastings  Bus.  L.J.  53  at  66.
25    Ari  Weinberg,  “The  Great  Derivatives  Smackdown”  Forbes  (9  May  2003).
26     Le er  to  Shareholders  of  Berkshire  Hathaway  from  Warren  Buﬀe   (8  March  2003).
27    Aaron  Unterman,  “Innovative  Destruction  –  Structured  Finance  and  Credit  Market  Reform  in  
the  Bubble  Era,”  (2009)  5  Hastings  Bus.  L.J.  53  at  92.  See  also  Sarra,  supra  note  2  at  468-‐‑472.
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history  (Argentina)  have  not  signiﬁcantly  impaired  the  capital  of  any  major  ﬁnancial  
intermediary.”28    While  Greenspan  recognized  that  there  are  costs  associated  with  the  
use  of  derivatives,  he  argued  that  the  beneﬁts  of  derivatives  have  “materially  exceeded  
their costs.”29
The  balancing  of  costs  and  beneﬁts  is  of  critical  importance  in  examining  the  extent  to  
which  the  derivatives  markets  ought  to  be  regulated  and  how  that  regulation  should  
be  implemented.    On  the  beneﬁts  side,  derivatives  play  an  important  role  in  managing  
the unpredictability and volatility of investment returns or liability obligations, help-‐‑
ing   to   hedge   against   risk.30      This   risk-‐‑shi ing   is   eﬀectively   a   form   of   insurance   that  
works  by  enabling  risk-‐‑exposed  parties  to  transfer  the  risk  of  losses  that  could  occur  
under certain contingencies to investors who would not otherwise face a particular
exposure.  Moreover,  derivatives  have  contributed  to  improved  market  liquidity  and  
play  an  important  price-‐‑discovery  role,  thereby  contributing  to  the  overall  eﬃciency  of  
the economy.31  Perhaps  the  most  salient  evidence  of  the  private  beneﬁts  of  derivatives,  
however,  is  the  spectacular  growth  that  derivatives  markets  have  seen,  with  notional  
positions  in  the  OTC  derivatives  market  alone  totaling  in  excess  of  $600  trillion.32    But  
on  the  costs  side,  derivatives  have  played  a  central  role  in  several  infamous  ﬁnancial  
scandals   and   corporate   failures,   including   the   near-‐‑collapse   and   subsequent   bailout  
of   LTCM,   the   recent  Asset-‐‑Backed   Commercial   Paper   (ABCP)   meltdown   in   Canada  
and   the   above-‐‑mentioned   dramatic   failures   of   Lehman   Brothers   Holdings   Inc.,   Bear  
Stearns,  and  AIG  in  2008.33 Excessive volatility on account of high levels of leverage
and  complexity  and  the  risk  of  market  destabilization  on  account  of  the  exponential  
growth  and  overconcentration  of  risk  in  a  few  main  counterparties  are  among  the  most  
cited  and  maligned  risks  associated  with  derivatives.34    Where  parties  are  over-‐‑lever-‐‑
aged,  risks  are  underestimated,  derivatives  use  is  widespread,  and  great  quantities  of  
derivatives  contracts  come  due,  then  the  contagion  of  default  quickly  and  disastrously  
spreads,  undermining  the  entire  ﬁnancial  system.
Thus  there  is  a  balance  that  must  be  struck  between  promoting  eﬃciency  and  allowing  
market  participants  the  full  range  of  freedom  to  transact  and  manage  risk  on  the  one  
hand,  and  protecting  market  participants  and  the  economy  as  a  whole  on  the  other.  
The  eﬀects  of  regulation  on  this  balance,  and  how  much  value  we  assign  to  the  various  
elements  at  play,  must  be  taken  into  account  in  designing  the  regulatory  scheme  for  
28    Speech  by  Alan  Greenspan  (8  May  2003)  to  the  2003  Conference  on  Bank  Structure  and  
Competition.
29 Ibid.
30   Kraus, supra  note  7  at  38.
31   Romano, supra  note  13  at  5.  See  also  Toni  Gravelle,  “Bank  of  Canada  Workshop  on  Derivatives  
Markets  in  Canada  and  Beyond”  (2007)  Bank  of  Canada  Review  37  at  39.
32   Expert Panel on Securities Regulation, Creating a Canadian Advantage in Global Capital Markets:
Final Report and Recommendations  (O awa:  Department  of  Finance  Canada,  2009)  at  55.
33   For more information see John Chant, The ABCP Crisis in Canada: The Implications for the
Regulation of Financial Markets,  Prepared  for  the  Expert  Panel  on  Securities  Regulation  (2008);  André  
Scheerer,  “Credit  Derivatives:  An  Overview  of  Regulatory  Initiatives  in  the  United  States  and  
Europe”  (2000)  5  Fordham  J.  Corp.  &  Fin.  L.  149  at  16;  and  Unterman,  supra  note  24  at  92–93.  
34   Kraus, supra  note  7  at  34.  See  also  Unterman,  supra  note  24  at  92;  and  Sarra,  supra  note  2  at  462.

Vol.  19    

Dalhousie  Journal  of  Legal  Studies    

37

derivatives  markets.

1. Arguments Against Regulating Derivatives
There are three common arguments made against more aggressively regulating de-‐‑
rivatives, particularly with respect to the largely unregulated OTC derivatives mar-‐‑
kets.  The  ﬁrst  argument  grounds  its  defence  of  the  laissez-faire approach in the fact that
derivatives  are  primarily  used  as  risk  management  tools.35    Speciﬁcally,  the  end-‐‑user  
can  employ  the  derivative  instrument  to  decrease  exposure  to  market  volatility  in  the  
underlying  asset  or  benchmark  and,  most  importantly,  to  systemic  risk.    As  previously  
discussed,  while  standard  equity  and  debt  portfolio  diversiﬁcation  can  nearly  elimi-‐‑
nate  all  un-‐‑systemic  risk  (risk  speciﬁc  to  a  given  ﬁnancial  product),  it  cannot  protect  
against  systemic  risk  (risk  that  pertains  to  the  entire  market).36 Using the leverage that
derivative  products  aﬀord,  “hedgers”  are  able  engage  in  transactions  with  a  notional  
value   in   excess   of   their   actual   risk   exposure.37 Employing credit derivatives to this
eﬀect,  major  ﬁnancial  institutions  were  able  to  cushion  themselves,  and  arguably  the  
system as a whole, from the full force of the blows that Enron and other major corpo-‐‑
rate failures would have dealt.38    With  these  beneﬁts  in  mind,  Chicago  School  “law  and  
economics” scholars tend to view regulation in this area as undesirable, as it decreases
eﬃciency  and  increases  the  cost  of  managing  risk  by  imposing  onerous  requirements  
on  market  participants  and  requiring  companies  in  a  competitive  market  to  forego  in-‐‑
formational advantages in the name of disclosure.39 Some commentators have argued
that  regulation  could  even  be  counterproductive  in  times  of  ﬁnancial  stress,  as  it  could  
create  market  rigidities  that  impede  the  responsiveness  and  resiliency  of  markets.40
The second major argument against further regulation, and one that is related to the
previous  argument,  is  that  because  the  form  that  derivative  products  can  take  is  lim-‐‑
ited  only  by  the  imagination  of  creative  ﬁnancial  engineers,  derivative  products  will  be  
diﬃcult  to  regulate.    They  simply  evolve  too  quickly  to  be  encompassed  by  any  regula-‐‑
tory net.41    The  point  here  is  that  regulating  would  not  only  be  ineﬀective,  as  it  could  
not  possibly  keep  pace  with  the  speed  of  the  market,  but  it  could  also  be  potentially  
damaging  by  artiﬁcially  raising  the  price  of  some  derivative  instruments  while  leav-‐‑
ing others completely untouched. In addition, overbroad or overzealous regulations
35     John-‐‑Peter  Castagnino,  Derivatives: The Key Principles: A Practical Guide to Markets, Products,
Contracts and Regulation (United  Kingdom:  Richmond  Law  &  Tax  Ltd.,  2003)  at  1.
36   Kraus, supra  note  7  at  38.
37     An  example  of  the  leverage  that  ﬁnancial  instruments  can  provide:  “A  $10  investment  may  
purchase  a  single  stock  with  the  value  of  $10,  or  ten  call  options  on  that  stock  at  a  market  price  of  $1  
each.  Assuming  the  exercise  price  of  the  options  are  $10  and  the  market  value  of  the  stock  rises  to  $15,  
the investment in the share would realize a 50% return while the equivalent investment in the options
(each  of  which  would  have  a  market  value  at  expiry  of  approximately  $5)  would  realize  a  return  of  
400%.”  Ibid.
38   Sarra, supra  note  2  at  453.
39   Romano, supra  note  13  at  78–80.  See  also  D.  Gowland,  The Regulation of Financial Markets in the
990s (Edward Elgar: England, 1990) at 2.
40     S.  Cohen,  “The  Challenge  of  Derivatives”  (1995)  63  Fordham  L.  Rev.  1993  at  2005.
41   Kraus, supra  note  7  at  38.
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could  hamper  the  entire  industry,  which  thrives  on  ﬂuidity  and  freedom  of  contract.42
Supporters   of   this   view   believe   that   the   derivatives   market   has   a   variety   of   built-‐‑in  
safeguards that would be counteracted through regulation.43 For example, the absence
of  a  clearinghouse  to  check  OTC  trades  theoretically  provides  incentive  for  participants  
to develop an expertise in the products that they deal with and to carefully monitor
counterparty creditworthiness. A system of regulation would arguably reduce this in-‐‑
centive.44    Fearful  that  the  rapidly  evolving  world  of  derivatives  trading  would  quickly  
outﬂank  any  regulatory  barriers  put  in  place, laissez-faire supporters believe that regu-‐‑
lation would compound this false complacency with an absence of protection.45 Even
worse,  the  damage  that  such  a  scenario  could  cause  would  be  magniﬁed  by  the  entry  
of  less-‐‑sophisticated  players  into  the  now  “regulated”  derivatives  market.46
The  third  line  of  argument  is  that  regardless  of  its  desirability,  a empting  to  further  
regulate  the  derivatives  markets  would  be  unsuccessful,  as  businesses  can  easily  move  
oﬀshore,   beyond   most   regulatory   control.47      In   a   market   such   as   Canada’s,   which   is  
relatively small compared to those in the United States and the United Kingdom,
capital  ﬂight  is  a  risk  that  must  be  considered  in  making  regulatory  decisions.48 The
Expert Panel on Securities Regulation recognized the reality of capital mobility in their
February 2009 Final Report. Despite advocating more regulatory oversight of OTC
derivatives, they ultimately deferred on recommending a change in the regulation of
OTC  derivatives  in  an  a empt  to  avoid  “being  out  of  step  with  much  larger  markets  
than our own.”49

2. Why Derivatives Markets ought to be Regulated
Derivatives,   despite   their   many   beneﬁts,   can   expose   users   –   and   even   the   economic  
system  as  a  whole  –  to  risk.    The  2008  ﬁnancial  crisis  was  a  reminder  of  just  how  dire  
the  consequences  can  be  when  the  ﬁnancial  system  breaks  down.  The  use,  and  o en  
misuse,   of   immensely   complicated   OTC   derivative   instruments   played   a   signiﬁcant  
role  in  triggering  and  deepening  the  ﬁnancial  crisis.    Investors  of  all  types,  even  the  
most  sophisticated,  did  not  always  know  or  understand  what  they  were  investing  in.    
Furthermore,  they  did  not  always  know  or  understand  how  to  manage  the  risk  that  is  
associated with the complex of the derivative instruments that they employed.50 The
42   Romano, supra  note  13  at  81.
43     Frank  Jan  De  Graaf  &  Cynthia  A.  Williams,  “The  Intellectual  Foundations  of  the  Global  ﬁnancial  
Crisis:  Analysis  and  Proposals  for  Reform”  (2009)  32  U.N.S.W.L.J.  390  at  393  –  401.
44     Thomas  Lee  Hazen,  “Filling  a  Regulatory  Gap:  It  Is  Time  to  Regulate  Over-‐‑the-‐‑Counter  
Derivatives”  (2009)  13  N.C.  Banking  Inst.  123  at  128.
45   Romano, supra  note  13  at  81.
46   Ibid.
47   Kraus, supra note 7 at 55.
48     Gordon  Walker  &  Mark  Fox,  “Globalization:  An  Analytical  Framework”  (1995-‐‑1996)  3  Ind.  J.  
Global  Legal  Stud.  375  at  384–385.
49   Expert Panel on Securities Regulation, supra  note  32  at  56.
50    Pierre  Duguay,  “Financial  Stability  through  Sound  Risk  Management”  (speech  to  the  Risk  
Management  Association,  Toronto  Chapter,  Toronto,  Ontario,  8  January  2009),  online:  <h p://www.
bankofcanada.ca/en/speeches/2009/sp09-‐‑1.html>.
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frenzied   pursuit   of   higher   and   higher   yield   led   many   to   presume   that   others   knew  
what  they  were  doing  and  that  risk  had  been  priced  appropriately,  or  at  least  to  be  will-‐‑
fully  blind  to  other  possibilities.    These  investors  substituted  the  judgments  of  credit-‐‑
rating  agencies  and  other  market  participants  for  their  own  due  diligence.51 Moreover,
the  complex  nature  of  the  derivative  instruments  being  used  and  the  murky  realm  in  
which  these  contracts  exist  made  it  diﬃcult  for  regulators  and  the  public  at  large  to  
monitor  the  levels  of  risk  that  were  being  taken  on.
This   opened   the   door   to   abuses   by   ﬁnancial   engineers   who   developed   increasingly  
complex and opaque structured products with massive amounts of embedded lever-‐‑
age. The opacity of these widely held instruments was compounded by a general disre-‐‑
gard  on  behalf  of  many  market  participants  for  economic  fundamentals.    For  example,  
many  borrowers  and  lenders  underestimated  the  risk  of  a  correction  in  real  estate  pric-‐‑
es  long  a er  activity  in  the  U.S.  housing  market  had  reached  its  crest.52 When the trou-‐‑
bles  in  the  housing  market  ﬁnally  materialized,  the  abrupt  realization  that  exposure  to  
defaults  was  both  widespread  and  diﬃcult  to  locate  led  to  a  broad  loss  of  conﬁdence  
and  extreme  risk  aversion  that  impeded  credit  expansion  and  began  to  slow  economic  
activity in Canada and abroad.53
Thus, the increasing complexity of many new derivative products poses challenges to
even the most sophisticated investor in terms of correctly modeling, understanding
and  managing  the  associated  risk.    To  cite  but  one  example,  it  can  be  diﬃcult  to  assess  
the  default  correlations  across  several  underlying  reference  assets  in  multi-‐‑name  credit  
default swaps (CDSs) and collateralized debt obligation (CDO) tranches.54 As a result,
the valuation of these derivative instruments is dependent on assumptions about de-‐‑
fault correlations made in models of the underlying debt obligations.55 The problem
of increasing complexity has been exacerbated by the increased participation in de-‐‑
rivatives  markets  of  less  sophisticated  investors  who  are  much  less  likely  to  have  the  
experience  or  the  resources  to  make  informed  investment  decisions  regarding  complex  
derivative products.56 One concern is that the ultimate holders of these instruments,
sophisticated   or   otherwise,   do   not   always   fully   comprehend   the   nature   of   their   risk  
exposure  and  how  exposure  under  complex  derivatives  diﬀers  from  exposure  under  
typical  debt  instruments  such  as  corporate  bonds.    This  leads  to  investors  over-‐‑relying  
51 Unterman, supra  note  24  at  97.
52    Eamonn  Moran,  “Wall  Street  Meets  Main  Street:  Understanding  the  Financial  Crisis”  (2009)  13  
N.C.  Banking  Inst.  5.
53   Ibid.
54     Default  correlation  refers  to  the  phenomenon  that  the  likelihood  of  one  debtor  defaulting  on  its  
debt  obligation  is  aﬀected  by  whether  or  not  another  debtor  has  defaulted  on  its  debts,  and  is  thus  
o en  largely  speculative.  See  also  International  Monetary  Fund,  “The  Inﬂuence  of  Credit  Derivative  
and  Structured  Credit  Markets  on  Financial  Stability”  (Global  Financial  Stability  Report,  2006)  at  54  
&  61;  and  Janet  M.  Tavakoli,  Credit Derivatives & Synthetic Structures,  2nd  ed.  (Toronto:  John  Wiley  &  
Sons,  Inc.,  2001)  at  73-‐‑140.
55    Gravelle,  supra  note  31  at  41.
56     United  States  Government  Accountability  Oﬃce,  Financial  Regulation:  A  Framework  for  
Cra ing  and  Assessing  Proposals  to  Modernize  the  Outdated  U.S.  Financial  Regulatory  System  
(January  2009)  at  42.
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on  the  rating  given  to  products  such  as  CDO  tranches  by  credit-‐‑rating  agencies  when  
making  their  investment  decisions.    As  was  made  clear  in  Canada  during  the  ABCP  cri-‐‑
sis,  the  risks,  when  misunderstood  or  hidden,  can  be  very  costly  indeed,  both  for  indi-‐‑
vidual  market  participants  and  at  a  macroeconomic  level.57 To illustrate how unaware
investors  can  overlook  the  risks  inherent  in  derivative  products,  one  has  only  to  look  
as  far  as  the  ratings  that  credit-‐‑rating  agencies  assign  to  various  ﬁnancial  instruments.58
Based  on  the  risk  proﬁling  and  reporting  methods  that  are  used,  it  is  possible  that  a  
rating  agency  will  similarly  rate  corporate  bonds  and  mezzanine-‐‑structured  credit  de-‐‑
rivative products, despite the fact that a corporate bond has an average recovery rate
in  the  40  to  60  percent  range,  whereas  when  the  credit  derivative  faces  default,  a  zero  
recovery rate is entirely possible.59
Not  all  market  participants  understand  derivatives  in  a  conceptual  and  technical  man-‐‑
ner. It is easy to see how investors, especially relatively unsophisticated ones, could
have   diﬃculty   navigating   the   complexities   of   the   derivatives   markets,   and   how   the  
uninformed  misuse  of  derivative  products  can  lead  some  market  participants  to  take  
market  positions  incommensurate  with  the  risk  they  are  prepared  to  assume.60 The
dire  consequences  of  miscalculation  and  mismanagement  in  this  area  of  the  ﬁnancial  
sector  are  too  great  to  ignore.    Increased  regulation  of  the  derivatives  markets  –  par-‐‑
ticularly  the  OTC  derivatives  markets  –  which  can  help  to  manage  the  risks  inherent  
in  these  instruments  and  ensure  that  investors  are  given  the  tools  to  make  rational  and  
informed decisions, and which discourages undesirable behaviour on the part of mar-‐‑
ket  participants,  is  warranted.
Moreover,  regulation  is  not  necessarily  a  deterrent  to  market  participation.    In  some  
cases   it   can   actually   be   a ractive   to   market   participants,   as   it   can   lower   transaction  
costs. Some commentators have argued that the increased regulatory burden that may
entice  market  participants  to  move  oﬀshore  to  a  jurisdiction  with  a  comparative  regu-‐‑
latory advantage would be diminished by the absence of clearinghouse facilities, and
hence  increased  credit  risks,  in  that  unregulated  OTC  market.61 Relying on counterpar-‐‑
ty  creditworthiness  alone  to  protect  against  default  and  bankruptcy  risks  would  deter  
many  from  looking  abroad  simply  on  the  basis  of  a  desire  for  regulatory  relief.62 That
said, the regulation project must be engaged dexterously and sparingly. Regulation
should  only  be  imposed  when  it  is  absolutely  necessary  to  obtain  an  eﬃciency,  fair-‐‑
ness,  or  stability  gain,  and  should  be  tailored  to  ensure  that  collateral  damage  is  kept  
to an absolute minimum. The next section will evaluate how Canada has fared with
57    Canadian  ﬁnancial  markets  were  disrupted  in  August,  2007  when  roughly  $32-‐‑billion  of  non-‐‑
bank  asset-‐‑backed  commercial  paper  (ABCP)  was  frozen  by  the  inability  of  the  conduits  to  rollover  
their  maturing  notes.  The  aﬀected  conduits  represented  27%  of  the  $117  billion  ABCP  market.  See  
Chant, supra  note  33.
58 Moran, supra  note  52  at  36–44.
59 International Monetary Fund, supra  note  54  at  61.  See  also  Moody’s  Global  Credit  Policy,  
“Corporate  Default  and  Recovery  Rates  –  1920-‐‑2008”  (February  2009),  online:  <www.moodys.com>.
60   Kraus, supra  note  7  at  56.
61   Ibid.
62   Ibid. at 57.
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regard to this project.

II. THE STATE OF DERIVATIVE REGULATION IN CANADA
This  section  examines  the  ways  in  which  Canada  has  a empted  to  negotiate  the  de-‐‑
rivatives  regulation  balance.    Canadian  regulation  in  this  area  has  suﬀered  from  a  lack  
of consensus over if, and in what circumstances, derivative instruments can be con-‐‑
sidered securities for regulatory purposes. Part 1 will examine why there has been
diﬃculty  coming  to  a  conclusion  regarding  just  where  derivatives  ﬁt  in.    Part  2  will  
explore the Canadian derivatives regulation landscape, highlighting how the various
provincial   regimes   have  dealt  with  derivatives.  Finally,  Part  3  is  concerned  with  the  
consequences of Canada’s approach to derivatives regulation.

1. The Diﬃculty of Regulating Derivatives – What Are They?
Exchange-Traded and Over-The-Counter Derivatives
As  was  touched  upon  earlier,  derivative  products  can  be  classiﬁed  as  either  exchange-‐‑
traded derivatives or OTC derivatives.63    Exchange-‐‑traded  derivatives  trade  over  a  pub-‐‑
lic  stock,  commodity,  or  derivatives  exchange  on  the  basis  of  standardized  contracts,  
where only the price is variable. Trades are carried out through a central clearinghouse
(such as the Canadian Derivatives Clearing Corporation), which requires trades to be
made  by  a  registered  member.    Under  the  rules  of  derivatives  exchanges,  market  par-‐‑
ticipants are required to post a margin that covers their exposure and guarantees the
performance  of  the  contract,  and  contracts  are  se led  on  a  daily  basis  (marking-‐‑to-‐‑mar-‐‑
ket),  so  credit  risk  is  greatly  reduced.64    Depending  on  the  province,  exchange-‐‑traded  
derivatives are subject to regulation by provincial securities regulators as well as the
exchange over which they are traded, or they are exempted from the traditional securi-‐‑
ties  disclosure  regime  and  subject  instead  to  the  distinct  obligations  imposed  by  “com-‐‑
modity  futures”  legislation.    Because  exchange-‐‑traded  derivative  instruments  tend  to  
ﬁt  neatly  within  their  prescribed  regimes,  and  as  they  are  traded  using  clearinghouses  
and  guarantors,  helping  to  mitigate  some  of  the  risk,  they  have  sparked  li le  contro-‐‑
versy.65 As such, these products are not the primary focus of the present discussion.
Most of the controversy has arisen in relation to OTC derivatives. OTC derivatives
consist of privately negotiated contracts that are typically entered into between sophis-‐‑
ticated  parties  such  as  ﬁnancial  institutions,  insurance  companies,  large  corporations,  

63     Gro enthaler  &  Henderson,  supra  note  7  at  1-‐‑4.
64   Ibid.
65     Jeﬀrey  G.  MacIntosh  &  Christopher  Nicholls,  Securities Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2002) at 52. See
also Kraus, supra  note  7  at  47.
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mutual funds and governments.66    These  contracts  diﬀer  from  exchange-‐‑traded  deriva-‐‑
tives in that they are customizable to the preferences of the parties.67 Common forms
of OTC derivatives include swaps, forwards, and options based on interest rates, cur-‐‑
rencies, equities and commodities.68 Standard practice is for the documentation of the
trades to be drawn up according to a formula engineered by the International Swaps
and Derivatives Association (ISDA), although the terms of OTC derivatives transac-‐‑
tions remain subject to individual negotiation.69 The terms are customized to the needs
of  the  parties  and  are  generally  se led  either  upon  completion  or  at  intervals  during  
the contract’s life. While OTC derivatives allow greater freedom to tailor the contract
to  the  speciﬁc  desires  of  the  parties,  they  also  expose  the  contracting  parties  to  the  in-‐‑
herent  credit  risk  that  the  counterparty  will  declare  bankruptcy  or  go  into  default.70

Are Derivatives “Securities”?
Many   exchange-‐‑traded   derivative   instruments   appear   to   be   very   similar   to   conven-‐‑
tional   securities   and   can   be   classiﬁed   as   being   “instruments   commonly   known   as   a  
securities”71 within the meaning of the original securities legislation. The accepted test
for  when  a  derivative  is  “commonly  known”  as  a  security  is  based  on  the  character  the  
instrument  is  given  in  commerce  with  regard  to  the  oﬀer,  method  of  distribution  and  
economic incentives held out.72 Thus, derivative instruments sold to retail investors
through   an   oﬀering   document   and   traded   on   an   organized   market   would   likely   be  
considered  securities  in  commercial  terms.    “Put”  options  and  rights  are  both  examples  
of  derivative  instruments  commonly  known  as  securities.73
In the 1980s, the advent of OTC derivatives and the development of new and more
complex derivative instruments began to expose holes in the system and prompted a
66     Commi ee  on  Payment  and  Se lement  Systems,  OTC  Derivatives:  Se lement  Procedures  and  
Counterparty Risk management (September  1998),  online:  <h p://www.bis.org>  at  9.
67   Marcone, supra  note  1  at  131.
68     R.  Marc  Mercier,  “The  Rise  of  Collateralization  in  Derivatives:  The  Dawning  of  a  New  Era”  in  Legal
and Business Guide to Derivatives Conference  (Toronto:  The  Canadian  Institute,  2004)  at  tab  V  at  2.    
It  should  be  noted  that  swaps  and  options  can  also  exist  as  exchange-‐‑traded  derivatives.  While  swaps  
are  typically  traded  over-‐‑the-‐‑counter,  examples  of  exchange  traded  swaps  include  the  interest  rate  
swaps  oﬀered  by  the  Chicago  Mercantile  Exchange.  For  a  detailed  examination  of  the  diﬀerence  
between  exchange-‐‑traded  and  OTC  options,  see  Tim  Weithers,  “Options  Fundamentals”  in  Jack  Clark  
Francis,  William  W.  Toy  &  Gregg  Whi aker,  eds.  The Handbook of Equity Derivatives – Revised Edition
(Toronto:  John  Wiley  &  Sons  Inc.,  2000)  at  5.  For  more  information  on  swaps,  options  and  forwards,  
see also Marcone, supra  note  1  at  111–126.
69     MacIntosh  &  Nicholls,  supra  note  65  at  52.  See  also  Kraus,  supra  note  7  at  47.
70 Kraus, supra  note  7  at  36.
71 Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S. 5, s. 1(1) [OSA].
72 Securities Exchange Commission v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp.  (1981),  320  U.S.  344  (1943),  relied  upon  
by  the  Québec  Securities  Commission  in  Re: John T. Gelderman & Co. Inc.,  July  1972,  3  Q.S.C.W.S.  No  
65.
73     MacIntosh  &  Nicholls,  supra  note  65  at  52.  The  OSA  speciﬁcally  recognizes  as  securities  “any  
commodity or futures contract or any commodity or futures option that is not traded on a commodity
futures exchange registered with or recognized by the Commission under the Commodity Futures Act
or the form of which is not accepted by the Director under the Act”. OSA, s. 1(1)(p).
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reevaluation of the regulatory approach.74 In some cases, these new OTC derivative
instruments were simply conventional securities overlaid by derivative contracts, but
in other cases, while they possessed many features that were reminiscent of securities,
these  contracts  could  not  ﬁt  the  traditional  technical  deﬁnition  of  a  security.75 At the
same time, as they were not traded over an exchange, the commodity futures model
did not apply.
This caused problems for many of the provinces that chose not to alter the traditional
conception   of   securities   and   the   “commodity   futures”   model.76 For example, none
of   the   elements   of   the   deﬁnition   in   the   Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5 (the
“OSA”)  –  including  the  broadest  parts  of  the  deﬁnition  of  a  “security”  that  reference  
interests  in  property,  investment  contracts  and  proﬁt-‐‑sharing  agreements  –  appear  to  
properly  ﬁt  many  OTC  derivatives.    This  is  not  surprising;  when  the  deﬁnition  of  se-‐‑
curities was being formulated, few derivatives had even been invented.77 That said,
provisions  that  ground  the  deﬁnition  of  a  security  in  whether  the  underlying  interest  is  
a  physical  security  arguably  provide  the  latitude  for  some  physically-‐‑se led  OTC  de-‐‑
rivatives  to  be  classiﬁed  as  securities.78    But  the  right,  title,  or  interest  must  be  actually  
conveyed  by  the  instrument  for  the  derivative  to  be  correctly  classiﬁed  as  a  security.79
Cash-‐‑se led  OTC  derivatives,  such  as  swaps,  do  not  ﬁt  well  within  this  classiﬁcation.    
Since  cash-‐‑se led  OTC  derivatives  typically  do  not  provide  for  a  transfer  of  rights  to  
the  capital,  assets,  property,  proﬁts,  earnings,  or  royalties  of  the  transacting  parties,  it  is  
not  likely  that  these  sorts  of  derivatives  would  provide  suﬃcient  evidence  of  an  inter-‐‑
est  to  be  classiﬁed  as  securities.80
In  fact,  it  would  be  diﬃcult  to  make  the  case  that  many  of  the  manifestations  of  OTC  
derivative instruments could be rightly considered securities for the purposes of se-‐‑
curities legislation. While the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Paciﬁc  Coast  Coin  
Exchange of Canada Ltd. v. Ontario (Securities Commission) provides an outline for when
a   derivative   instrument   can   constitute   an   “investment   contract”   for   the   purposes   of  
securities  legislation,  many  OTC  derivatives  do  not  ﬁt  this  description  and  could  not  
commonly be considered securities.81 Thus ambiguity at the margins remains, as no
Canadian  judicial  pronouncement  has  deﬁnitively  outlined  when  an  OTC  derivative  
74     Gro enthaler  &  Henderson,  supra  note  7  at  10-‐‑5.
75 Ibid.
76     For  example,  British  Columbia  did  have  speciﬁc  commodity  futures  legislation  like  Ontario  until  
1990, when the Commodity Futures Act  (British  Columbia)  was  repealed  by  the  Securities  Amendment  
Act,  S.B.C.  1990  c.  25,  s.  52,  eﬀective  1996,  and  the  deﬁnitions  of  “exchange  contract”  and  “security”  
were  clariﬁed  to  be  more  inclusive  of  OTC  derivatives,  as  will  be  explained  in  part  2(B)(ii)  below.
77    MacIntosh  &  Nicholls,  supra  note  65  at  49.
78    Deﬁnitions  from  OSA,  s.  1(1):  “Any  document  constituting  evidence  of  an  option,  subscription  or  
other  interest  in  or  to  a  security;”  and  “Any  document  constituting  evidence  of…  an  underlying  inter-‐‑
est  in  the  capital,  assets,  property,  proﬁts,  earnings  or  royalties  of  any  person  or  company.”  
79    Gro enthaler  &  Henderson,  supra  note  7  at  10-‐‑7.
80 Ibid.  at  10-‐‑8.
81    Paciﬁc  Coast  Coin  Exchange  of  Canada  Ltd.  v.  Ontario  (Securities  Commission),  [1978]  2  S.C.R.  
112 (S.C.C.) [Paciﬁc  Coast  Coin].
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can be considered a security.82 According to the test set out in Paciﬁc  Coast  Coin,  if a
cash-‐‑se led  OTC  derivative  is  entered  into  between  sophisticated  parties,  is  tailored  
to the individual requirements of the parties, is not assignable or part of a larger class
in  an  oﬀering,  requires  credit-‐‑analysis  of  the  counterparty,  is  entered  into  on  a  one-‐‑on-‐‑
one  basis  and  is  not  marketed  to  the  public,  then  “the  statutory  deﬁnition  of  the  term  
‘security,’  should  generally  result  in  a  cash-‐‑se led  derivative  […]  not  being  considered  
a security.”83  As  swap  contracts  (which  o en  possess  the  characteristics  just  enumerat-‐‑
ed)  are  the  most  common  form  of  OTC  derivative,  a  great  deal  of  the  market  activity  in  
OTC derivatives does not technically fall under the purview of securities legislation.84
Moreover,  despite  the  fact  that  some  physically-‐‑se led  derivatives  could  potentially  
fall  under  the  purview  of  securities  law,  in  many  cases  a  physically-‐‑se led  OTC  de-‐‑
rivative does not have the characteristics of a security and so ambiguity remains. For
example,  physically-‐‑se led  OTC  derivatives  may  only  provide  for  physical  se lement  
when   there   is   a   market   disruption   or   some   other   event   that   makes   it   impossible   to  
determine  a  cash  price  to  satisfy  the  terms  of  the  contract.    In  those  cases  it  is  diﬃcult  
to  characterize  the  OTC  derivative  as  an  “option”  on  a  security.85 Moreover, delivery
of   a   security   would   not   require   prospectus   qualiﬁcation   under   provincial   securities  
laws, assuming the security was previously issued and is not derived from a control
block.86 Even application of one of the primary policy objectives of traditional securi-‐‑
ties statutes – the protection of investors – does not resolve the problem of whether
derivatives  can  be  classiﬁed  as  securities.    In  many  cases,  Jeﬀrey  MacIntosh  notes,  “it  is  
impossible to determine who is the vendor of the ‘security,’ and who is the ‘investor’ in
order to determine who needs the protection.”87 Furthermore, in transactions involv-‐‑
ing sophisticated parties, the disclosure element of securities law is normally relaxed.
As the parties to OTC derivative transactions such as swap arrangements are typically
ﬁnancial  institutions,  corporations  and  governments,  they  do  not  generally  require  the  
protections furnished by securities legislation.88 Accordingly, there is a strong argu-‐‑
ment  that  many  OTC  derivatives  –  both  cash-‐‑se led  and  physically-‐‑se led  –  are  not  
necessarily securities and should not be treated as such. This outcome, however, has
been  unsatisfactory  for  many  provinces.  Numerous  calls  for  and  a empts  at  clariﬁca-‐‑
tion  have  been  made  in  each  province.  The  following  section  will  look  at  how  success-‐‑
ful these initiatives have been.
It  is  possible  that  a empting  to  ﬁt  derivative  instruments  under  the  securities  regime  
is,  in  many  cases,  an  a empt  to  drive  a  square  peg  into  a  round  hole.    The  issue  has  cer-‐‑
tainly  not  been  resolved  in  Canada.    There  has  been  a  historical  diﬀerence  of  opinion  
as  to  whether  or  not  derivatives  are  “securities,”  or  should  be  treated  as  such,  for  the  
82   
83    
84    
85   
86  
87   
88

MacIntosh  &  Nicholls,  supra  note  65  at  49.
Gro enthaler  &  Henderson,  supra  note  7  at  10-‐‑11.
MacIntosh  &  Nicholls,  supra  note  65  at  53.
Gro enthaler  &  Henderson,  supra  note  7  at  10-‐‑13.
Ibid.
MacIntosh  &  Nicholls,  supra  note  65  at  53.
Ibid.
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purposes  of  regulation.    This  confusion  is  only  worsened  by  the  quickly  evolving  na-‐‑
ture  of  the  derivatives  markets.    Largely  a  result  of  this  uncertainty,  Canada  has  three  
diﬀerent  regulatory  approaches  among  ﬁve  provinces.89

2. Derivatives Regulation in Canada
Gro enthaler  notes  that  “in  Canada,  as  in  many  other  jurisdictions,  the  history  of  the  
regulation  of  derivative  instruments  has  been  an  exercise  in  a empting  to  ﬁt  deriva-‐‑
tives  within  pre-‐‑existing  regulatory  structures  that  were  designed  with  the  regulation  
of  non-‐‑derivatives  in  mind.”90 Unfortunately, the persisting uncertainty about where
derivatives  ﬁt  into  the  regulatory  scheme  is  compounded  by  the  diﬃculties  that  result  
from  the  heterogeneity  of  the  provincial  securities  regulators,  producing  an  awkward  
and inconsistent approach to derivatives regulation in Canada. Despite the fact that
only  ﬁve  provinces  have  even  a empted  to  regulate  in  this  area,  three  separate  and  
distinct approaches have developed. One of these approaches is shared by Ontario
and  Manitoba,  which  regulate  certain  exchange-‐‑traded  derivatives  under  their  respec-‐‑
tive   Commodity   Futures  Acts   and   leave   OTC   derivative   markets   largely   untouched  
by   securities   law.      British   Columbia   and  Alberta   have   gone   in   a   diﬀerent   direction,  
expanding the scope of their existing securities legislation in order to incorporate de-‐‑
rivatives   markets   regulation   within   the   securities   regulatory   regime.     And   with   the  
introduction   of   a   separate   and   focused  Act   for   regulating   both   OTC   and   exchange-‐‑
traded  derivatives,  Québec  has  charted  its  own  course.    Each  of  these  systems  will  be  
described below.

Ontario and Manitoba
Ontario  and  Manitoba  have  similar  regimes,  dating  back  to  the  late  1970s  when  both  
provinces  opted  to  engage  in  the  bulk  of  their  derivatives  regulation  outside  of  their  
securities legislation. Despite the fact that there is a developed commodity derivatives
market  in  Manitoba,  it  is  the  Ontario  derivatives  scheme  that  will  be  the  primary  fo-‐‑
cus of this section, both in the interest of parsimony and because the Ontario Security
Commission  (the  “OSC”)  has  driven  the  subsequent  evolution  in  this  area.
Most   exchange-‐‑traded   derivatives   are   not   regulated   under   securities   legislation   in  
Ontario   and   Manitoba.      Instead,   separate   “commodity   futures”   legislation   governs  
a   large   portion   of   the   exchange-‐‑traded   derivative   market.91 The Ontario Commodity
Futures Act (the  “CFAO”)  contains  registration  requirements  for  exchanges  operating  
in the province and imposes dealer and advisor registration requirements with respect
to trading or advising on commodity futures contracts that are traded on recognized
exchanges.92     An   exchange-‐‑traded   commodity   futures   contract   or   option   that   trades  
89 Expert Panel on Securities Regulation, supra  note  32  at  56.
90    Gro enthaler  &  Henderson,  supra  note  7  at  10-‐‑5.
91 The Commodity Futures Act, C.C.S.M.  1996,  c.  C152;  and  Commodity Futures Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.
C20, as amended.
92 Expert Panel on Securities Regulation, supra  note  32  at  76.  See  also  Kraus,  supra  note  7  at  49.
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on  an  exchange  that  is  not  recognized  by  the  OSC  is  deemed  a  “security”  for  the  pur-‐‑
poses of securities legislation and will be regulated under the OSA.93 Accordingly, the
CFAO applies only to commodity futures contracts and options that trade on accred-‐‑
ited  exchanges.    Other  exchange-‐‑traded  derivatives  may  fall  under  securities  regula-‐‑
tion. However, this does not mean that any contract or option that is not caught by the
CFAO  constitutes  a  security.    Exchange-‐‑traded  contracts  and  options  that  do  not  fall  
under  the  CFAO  must  constitute  an  “investment  contract”  to  be  regulated  under  the  
OSA.94    Derivative  products  such  as  exchange-‐‑traded  index-‐‑linked  notes,  hedge  funds  
and  options  on  securities  are  investment  products  that  o en  ﬁt  this  description,  in  that  
they share characteristics of both securities and derivatives.95
With respect to OTC derivatives, the application of securities regulation is not entirely
clear.    As  previously  discussed,  the  deﬁnition  of  a  “security”  in  the  OSA  does  not  clear-‐‑
ly capture OTC derivatives.96    This  has  generated  a  lack  of  consensus  as  to  whether  par-‐‑
ticular  types  of  OTC  derivatives,  such  as  those  that  involve  the  physical  se lement  of  
equities or debt securities, could be considered securities for the purpose of the legisla-‐‑
tion.97  In  the  vast  majority  of  cases,  cash-‐‑se led  OTC  derivatives  are  not  characterized  
as securities.98 However, uncertainty exists. The worry is that OTC derivative transac-‐‑
tions that require the physical delivery of an underlying security could be construed
as  “acts  in  furtherance  of  a  trade”.99 For example, under the current regime, the use of
some hybrid derivative instruments, such as principal protected notes – which are not
technically  securities,  despite  possessing  many  security-‐‑like  characteristics  –  will  sub-‐‑
ject the dealer to registration requirements under the OSA, as their use is deemed to be
an act in furtherance of a trade.100    The  eﬀects  of  this  ambiguity,  however,  are  limited,  
and  largely  conﬁned  to  mutual  fund  and  investment  managers  who  engage  in  whole-‐‑

93     Report  of  the  Interministerial  Commi ee  on  Commodity  Futures  Trading  (Toronto:  Ministry  of  
Commercial  Relations,  1975).  See  also  Gro enthaler  &  Henderson,  supra  note  7  at  10-‐‑10.
94     Gro enthaler  &  Henderson,  supra  note  7  at  10-‐‑10.  See  also  OSA,  s.  1(1)(n).
95 Ibid.
96  See  OSA,  ss.1(1)(a),(b),(d),(f),(n),(p).  The  term  “security”  can  include:  any  document,  instrument  
or  writing  commonly  known  as  a  security;  any  document  constituting  evidence  of  title  or  to  earn  an  
interest  in  the  capital,  assets,  property,  proﬁts,  earnings  or  royalties  of  any  person  or  company;  any  
document  constituting  evidence  of  an  option,  subscription  or  other  interest  in  or  to  a  security;  any  
agreement under which the interest of the purchaser is valued for purposes of conversion or sur-‐‑
render  by  reference  to  the  value  of  a  proportionate  interest  in  a  speciﬁed  portfolio  of  assets,  except  
[certain  insurance  contracts];  any  investment  contract,  other  than  an  investment  contract  within  the  
meaning of the Investment Contracts Act,  R.S.O.  1990,  c.  I  14;  and  any  commodity  futures  contract  or  
any commodity futures option that is not traded on a commodity futures exchange registered with or
recognized by the Commission under the Commodity Futures Act, or the form of which is not accepted
by the Director under that Act.
97 Expert Panel on Securities Regulation, supra  note  32  at  76.
98 Ibid.
99    Ontario  Commodity  Futures  Act  Advisory  Commi ee, Final Report (Toronto: Ontario Ministry of
Governmental  Services,  2007)  at  39.  See  also  Expert  Panel  on  Securities  Regulation,  supra  note  32  at  76.  
“[A]ny  act,  advertisement,  solicitation,  conduct  or  negotiation  directly  or  indirectly  in  furtherance  of  
any of the foregoing [trade or trading].” OSA, s. 1(1)(e).
100 Ibid.  See  also  Gro enthaler  &  Henderson,  supra  note  7  at  10-‐‑5  –  10-‐‑11.
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sale  marketing  of  such  hybrid  products.101    In  most  cases,  it  is  unlikely  that  derivatives  
that require physical delivery would be characterized as securities separate from the
underlying interest upon which they are based.102 Moreover, to the extent that deriva-‐‑
tives  do  fall  within  the  deﬁnition  of  “securities”  provided  in  the  OSA,  their  users  are  
generally exempt from prospectus and registration requirements, as they will typically
qualify for private placement exemptions.103 Thus the vast majority of OTC derivatives
are not directly regulated in Ontario.
The  OSC  does  have  rule-‐‑making  power  to  regulate  derivatives  to  the  extent  that  they
involve  securities  markets.104    But  while  the  OSC  has  exercised  that  power  to  deﬁne  
“derivative”  in  Rule  14-‐‑501,  it  has  yet  to  exercise  its  jurisdiction  under  the  OSA  in  any  
comprehensive way with respect to OTC contracts. The closest it has come is in pub-‐‑
lishing  proposed  Rule  91-‐‑504,  whereby  all  OTC  derivatives  would  have  been  either  ex-‐‑
empt from the application of the OSA entirely or exempt from the dealer and registra-‐‑
tion requirements.105    Rule  91-‐‑504  was  returned  to  the  Commission  by  the  Minister  of  
Finance  for  reconsideration  in  2000,  and  there  has  been  li le  movement  since  then.106
There  have  been  a  number  of  calls  and  a empts  for  reform  of  Ontario’s  approach  to  
derivatives  regulation.    In  its  2007  ﬁnal  report  on  the  CFAO,  the  Ontario  Commodity  
Futures  Advisory  Commi ee  concluded  that  the  CFAO  was  outdated  and  in  immediate  
need  of  reform  or  replacement,  and  suggested  that  exchange-‐‑traded  derivatives  be  reg-‐‑
ulated using a more targeted approach.107 The Expert Panel on Securities Regulation’s
2009  report  went  further  and  called  for  the  regulation  of  exchange-‐‑traded  derivatives  
from within the securities regime.108 Other calls have suggested that OTC derivatives
be regulated in a limited but precise way by the OSC, following up on the theme of the
OSC’s  ill-‐‑fated  proposed  Rule  91-‐‑504.109 However, despite the calls for change and the
countless  hours  that  have  been  spent  dra ing  and  reviewing  proposed  rules,  to  date  

101    Paul  Dempsey,  “Registration  May  Be  Unavoidable  for  Ontario  Hedge  Fund  Managers”  (Toronto:  
Gowlings  LLP,  October  2003),  online:  <h p://www.gowlings.com/resources/PublicationPDFs/
DempseyP_CanHedgeOct03.pdf  >.
102    Gro enthaler  &  Henderson,  supra  note  7  at  10-‐‑8.
103     OSC  Rule  45-‐‑501  Exempt Distributions.  See  also  Gro enthaler  &  Henderson,  supra  note  7  at  10-‐‑20.
104   Securities Amendment Act,  1994,  S.O.  1994,  c.  33,  s.  8.  See  also  Gro enthaler  &  Henderson,  supra
note  7  at  10-‐‑14.  “Bill  90  has  given  the  OSC  power  to  make  rules  regulating  or  varying  the  OSA  in  re-‐‑
spect  of  derivatives.  Section  143(1)  of  the  OSA  now  provides,  inter  alia,  that  the  OSC  may  make  rules  
in respect of the following:
“…35.  Regulating  or  varying  this  Act  in  respect  of  derivatives,  including,  (i)  providing  exemp-‐‑
tions from any requirements of this Act, (ii) prescribing disclosure requirements and requiring or
prohibiting  the  use  of  particular  forms  or  types  of  oﬀering  documents  or  other  documents;  and  (iii)  
prescribing  requirements  that  apply  to  mutual  funds,  non-‐‑redeemable  investment  funds,  commod-‐‑
ity pools or other issuers.”
105    Gro enthaler  &  Henderson,  supra  note  7  at  10-‐‑22.
106   Expert Panel on Securities Regulation, supra  note  32  at  77.
107    Ontario  Commodity  Futures  Act  Advisory  Commi ee,  supra note 99 at 15.
108 Expert Panel on Securities Regulation, supra  note  32  at  56.
109 Ibid. at 77.
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the situation is largely (somewhat uncertain) business as usual in Ontario.110

BC and Alberta
In   contrast   to   Ontario   and   Manitoba,  Alberta   and   British   Columbia   regulate   deriva-‐‑
tives directly through their respective securities laws.111    The  laws  regulate  exchange-‐‑
traded  derivatives  based  on  the  concept  of  “exchange  contracts.”112 Exchange contracts
are  not  included  in  the  deﬁnition  of  “security,”  but  are  incorporated  into  the  securities  
regime through the imposition of registration requirements for dealers and advisors,
and through the regulation of exchanges on which exchange contracts are traded (pur-‐‑
suant to recognition requirements for such exchanges).113 This is a broader approach
than  is  taken  in  the  Ontario  and  Manitoba  commodity  futures  legislation,  which  cover  
only  options  on  commodity  futures  contracts  and  consider  other  exchange-‐‑traded  op-‐‑
tions (such as options on shares) to be securities.114
Unlike   exchange-‐‑traded   derivatives,   OTC   derivatives   are   generally   included   in   the  
deﬁnition  of  “security”  in  Alberta  and  British  Columbia.115    But  while  they  are  techni-‐‑
cally governed by the provinces’ respective Securities Acts, the application of most of
the   provisions   of   securities   legislation   to   OTC   derivatives   are   clawed   back   through  
broadly  applicable  “blanket”  exemptions.116
For example, in response to pleas for relief from the prospectus and registration re-‐‑
quirements  of  the  British  Columbia Securities Act (“BCSA”)  made  by  OTC  derivative  
market  participants,  the  BCSC  issued  a  number  of  Blanket  Orders,  including  91-‐‑501  
and  91-‐‑503.    These  Orders  exempt  OTC  short-‐‑term  foreign  exchange  transactions  and  
derivative  transactions  where  the  principals  are  qualiﬁed  parties  from  the  registration  
and  prospectus  requirements.    The  deﬁnition  of  a  “qualiﬁed  party”  in  Blanket  Order  
91-‐‑503   includes   Canadian   banks   and   insurance   companies,   Basel  Accord   banks   and  
insurance companies, trust companies, sophisticated users, pension funds, registered
portfolio  managers,  high  net-‐‑worth  individuals,  business  organizations  with  over  $25  
million in assets, and domestic and foreign governments.117    A  “qualiﬁed  party”  can  
also include a party entering into an OTC derivative contract where the underlying
110    Mark  R.  Smith,  “Basic  Derivatives  for  the  Oil  and  Gas  Company”  (2001)  39  Alta.  L.  Rev.  152  at  
para.  56.  See  also  Expert  Panel  on  Securities  Regulation,  supra  note  32  at  78.
111 Securities Act (British Columbia),  R.S.B.C.  1996,  C.  418  [BSCA];  Alberta Securities Act, R.S.A. 2000, c.
S-‐‑4  [ASA].
112 BCSA, s. 1(1); ASA, s. 1(s).
113   Expert Panel on Securities Regulation, supra  note  32  at  75.
114     Shahen  A.  Mirakian  and  Brian  Studniberg,  “Canada:  Expert  Panel  Report  Makes  
Recommendations Regarding Federal Derivatives Regulation” (Toronto: McMillan Financial Law
Update, 22 March 2009) at 2.
115 ASA, s. 1(ggg); BCSA, s. 1(1).
116   Expert Panel on Securities Regulation, supra  note  8  at  76.
117    Alberta  Securities  Commission  Blanket  Order  91-‐‑501,  Recognition of exchanges outside Alberta
for purposes of trading in exchange contracts  (eﬀective  February  2001).  Alberta  Securities  Commission  
Blanket  Order  91-‐‑503,  Over-the-Counter Derivatives Transactions and Commodity Contracts – Consolidated
Version (as  varied  5  June  2008),  s.  1(3).
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interest is, or is substantially related to, a commodity used in such party’s business.
Originally,  these  blanket  orders  were  intended  to  be  temporary  measures  in  advance  
of   the   implementation   of   a   revamped   BCSA.      However,   the   government   of   British  
Columbia   announced   that   the   implementation   of   the   new   BCSA   would   be   delayed  
indeﬁnitely.118    Thus,  it  seems  that  until  a  new  British  Columbia  securities  regime  is  
implemented,  Blanket  Orders  91-‐‑501  and  91-‐‑503  will  remain  in  force.119 Alberta’s regu-‐‑
latory scheme is, for all practical purposes, largely identical.120
The  British  Columbia  and  Alberta  approaches  have  been  criticized  for  regulating  OTC  
derivatives on the surface, but in reality only regulating retail OTC derivative transac-‐‑
tions,   leaving   the   majority   of   the   market   untouched.      Inadequacies   commonly   cited  
with  this  approach  include  the  diﬃculty  in  determining  whether  a  particular  type  of  
derivative is or is not regulated as a security, particularly on account of the fact that the
evolving  nature  of  the  derivatives  markets  tends  to  outpace  the  comparatively  static  
legislation that is intended to contain them.121 Moreover, as addressed earlier, there
are   serious   questions   regarding   whether   a   derivative   can   be   properly   classiﬁed  as   a  
security  and  whether  such  classiﬁcation  is  appropriate  in  light  of  the  characteristics  of  
derivative instruments.

Québec
In  February   2009,   the  Québec  legislature  enacted  legislation  that  applies  to  both  ex-‐‑
change-‐‑traded  derivatives  and  OTC  derivatives,  to  be  administered  by  the  Authorité
des  marchés  ﬁnanciers  (the  “AMF”).    The  Québec  Derivatives Act (the  “QDA”)  is  the  ﬁrst  
independent and comprehensive derivatives regulatory scheme in Canada. Despite
falling under the auspices of the province’s securities regulator, the QDA deliberately
separates derivatives from the securities regime in place in the province.122 The Act
lays  out  a  principles-‐‑based  approach  to  derivatives  regulation,  intended  to  permit  ad-‐‑
justments   to   keep   pace   with   the   evolution   of   the   market.      Its   purpose   is   to   provide  
a  more  eﬃcient  and  eﬀective  regime  to  govern  oﬀering,  trading,  and  other  activities  
related to all forms of derivative instruments, in light of the unprecedented expansion
and  evolution  of  the  derivatives  markets  worldwide.123    It  also  represents  an  a empt  
by  the  province  to  reinforce  its  hold  on  the  lucrative  Canadian  exchange-‐‑traded  deriva-‐‑
tives  market,  which  is  currently  dominated  by  the  Montréal  Exchange.    In  the  words  of  
the  Québec  Minister  of  Finance,  Monique  Jérôme-‐‑Forget,  “[The  Act]  will  aﬀord  users  
of  derivatives  the  protection  they  need,  helping  to  make  Québec  one  of  the  best  places  
118    David  Johnston  &  Kathleen  Doyle  Rockwell,  Canadian Securities Regulation  (Markham:  
LexisNexis  Canada  Inc.,  2006)  at  16–18.
119    Alberta  Securities  Commission  Blanket  Order  91-‐‑501;  Alberta  Securities  Commission  Blanket  
Order  91-‐‑503,  s.  1(3).
120    Gro enthaler  &  Henderson,  supra  note  7  at  10-‐‑64.
121 Expert Panel on Securities Regulation, supra  note  32  at  76.
122    Derivatives  Act  (Québec),  S.Q.  2008,  c.  24.
123     Ogilvy  Renault  LLP,  “The  Quebec  Derivatives Act Comes into Force” (Toronto: Ogilvy Renault
LLP Corporate Finance and Securities Update, February 2009) at 1.
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in the world to use derivatives.”124
The  deﬁnition  of  a  “derivative”  in  the  QDA  is  broad.    It  includes  any  contract  or  instru-‐‑
ment designated by regulation and is structured in a way that enables it to encompass
potential future derivative products consisting of any contract or instrument that is
equivalent to a derivative on the basis of criteria determined by regulation.125 In terms
of the actors it targets, the QDA imposes recognition and registration requirements on
intermediaries as well as registration requirements on dealers and advisors.
The  QDA  regulates  trading  and  advisory  activities  relating  to  both  exchange-‐‑traded  
and  OTC  derivatives.    With  regard  to  exchange-‐‑traded  derivatives  (referred  to  in  the  
QDA  as  “standardized  derivatives”),  the  QDA  requires  that  “regulated  entities”  seek-‐‑
ing  to  carry  on  derivatives-‐‑related  activities  in  Québec  as  an  exchange,  alternative  trad-‐‑
ing   system,   published   market,   clearinghouse,   regulation   services   provider,   informa-‐‑
tion   processor,   or   self-‐‑regulatory   organization,   be   recognized   by   the  AMF.126 These
entities are then subject to various requirements including mandates for cooperation
with  the  AMF,  operational  and  control  rules,  governance  practices,  disclosure,  the  ﬁling  
of  annual  audited  ﬁnancial  information,  and  self-‐‑certiﬁcation.127 The Policy Statement
Respecting   Self-‐‑Certiﬁcation   elaborates   on   the   novel   certiﬁcation   process   that   a   recog-‐‑
nized regulated entity must follow when amending its rules and products. Essentially,
proposed  amendments  must  be  submi ed  for  public  consultation  for  a  period  of  30  
days before they can be adopted.128 Rules with minor impact, emergency rules and
new derivatives are not subject to this public oversight.129 The legislation also sets out
requirements  for  the  public  oﬀering  of  OTC  and  exchange-‐‑traded  derivatives,  which  
involves providing the AMF and the client with detailed information about the deriva-‐‑
tive  that  is  being  oﬀered.130
The  Act  deﬁnes  an  “over-‐‑the-‐‑counter  derivative”  as  any  derivative  other  than  a  “stan-‐‑
dardized derivative.”131    Unlike  the  other  provincial  regimes,  the  QDA  does  not  com-‐‑
pletely exempt OTC derivatives from the application of the Act. However, it does
allow exemptions from the application of some of the substantive provisions of the
legislation, including dealer and adviser registration, for OTC derivatives transactions
124     Minster  Monique  Jérôme-‐‑Forget,  “Towards  Be er  Oversight  of  Derivatives  Trading  in  Québec,”  
Government of Québec News Service (April  9,  2008),  online:  <h p://communiques.gouv.qc.ca/gouvqc/
communiques/GPQE/Avril2008/09/c4088.html?slang=en>.
125    QDA,  s.  3  and  6.  “’derivative’  means  an  option,  a  swap,  a  futures  contract  or  any  other  contract  
or  instrument  whose  market  price,  value,  or  delivery  or  payment  obligations  are  derived  from,  
referenced to or based on an underlying interest, or any other contract or instrument designated by
regulation or considered equivalent to a derivative on the basis of criteria determined by regulation.”
126   QDA, s. 12
127    QDA,  s.  19-‐‑38.
128    QDA,  s.  19-‐‑25.
129    QDA,  s.  32.  See  also  Josée  Kouri,  Ward  Sellers,  Mark  DesLauriers  and  Jake  Sadikman,  “Québec  
Derivatives Act and Derivatives Regulation  Now  In  Force”  (Toronto:  Osler  Business  Law  Update,  3  
February  2009)  at  3.  
130   QDA, s. 7 and 82.
131     QDA,  s.  3.
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involving  “accredited  counterparties.”132 Notably, the Act does not extend this exemp-‐‑
tion   to   exchange-‐‑traded   derivatives   activities   with   accredited   counterparties.   This   is  
a  signiﬁcant  departure  from  the  previous  regime  under  the  Québec  Securities Act (the
“QSA”),133 under which dealers and advisers trading or managing investments using
exchange-‐‑traded   derivatives   could   beneﬁt   from   registration   exemptions   such   as   the  
“accredited  investor”  exemption.134
An  “accredited  counterparty”  under  the  QDA  is  a  person  whose  resources,  situation  
or  knowledge  are  such  that  the  Québec  legislature  has  seen  ﬁt  to  exempt  their  transac-‐‑
tions from certain provisions of the Act.135 The Policy Statement respecting Accredited
Counterparties indicates that it is the responsibility of the party engaged in the transac-‐‑
tion  to  determine  whether  its  counterparty  is  accredited  such  that  the  blanket  exemp-‐‑
tion in the QDA for OTC derivatives activities is applicable, giving some instruction as
to how that determination can be made.136
The Act also confronts the issue of hybrid products, which are instruments, contracts
or securities that combine elements of both derivatives and securities, such as deriva-‐‑
tives  linked  to  a  portfolio  of  securities,  an  index  or  a  basket  of  indexes.137 The QDA
sets out the test to determine whether the hybrid product is governed by the QSA or
the QDA.138 This distinction is elaborated upon in the Policy Statement respecting Hybrid
Products. Essentially, a hybrid product is within the jurisdiction of the QDA unless it
can be shown that the instrument is predominantly a security.139
While the QDA is new and the majority of its provisions have yet to be truly tested, the
regime  embarks  on  a  bold  new  course  of  derivatives  regulation  in  Canada.    Compared  
with   the   awkward   a empts   to   ﬁt   derivatives   into   securities   legislation   and   the   out-‐‑
dated   “commodity   futures”   model,   the   Québec   approach   seems   to   oﬀer   an   elegant  
solution  to  the  intricate  problem  of  derivative  markets  regulation.    Aside  from  be er  
targeting   the   current   state   of   the   derivatives   markets,   the   QDA   also   seems   to   have  
the  ﬂexibility  to  accommodate  evolutions  in  derivative  instruments  and  markets.  The  
QDA represents an encouraging development in Canadian derivatives regulation.

3. Problems with the Canadian Regulation Scheme
Regulation   in   this   area   has   suﬀered   from   a   lack   of   a ention   and   coordinated   eﬀort.    
The  inconsistency  in  treatment  of  derivatives  and  the  inﬂexible  and  outdated  way  that  
132   Expert Panel on Securities Regulation, supra  note  32  at  77.
133   Québec Securities Act,  R.S.Q.,  c.  V.  1-‐‑1  [the  “QSA”].
134 QDA, s. 43.
135     QDA,  s.  3(1).
136     Autorité  des  marches  ﬁnanciers,  Policy  Statement  respecting  Accredited  Counterparties,  
Derivatives  Act  (Québec:  AMF,  22  January  2009).
137     Autorité  des  marches  ﬁnanciers,  Policy  Statement  respecting  Hybrid  Products,  Derivatives  Act  
(Québec:  AMF,  22  January  2009)  [Policy  Statement  respecting  Hybrid  Products].
138     QDA,  s.  3.
139   Policy Statement respecting Hybrid Products.
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derivatives regulation is approached have resulted in an atmosphere where the major-‐‑
ity  of  the  OTC  derivatives  market  is  unregulated.    This  was  not  much  of  a  worry  in  the  
past,  as  it  had  long  been  assumed  that  sophisticated  market  actors  would  be  able  to  ef-‐‑
fectively  monitor  their  own  levels  of  risk  and  not  purposefully  expose  themselves  to  le-‐‑
verage  or  risk  that  was  individually  (or  systemically)  destructive.    But  this  assumption  
has  turned  out  to  be  incorrect,  as  the  recent  ﬁnancial  crisis  poignantly  exposed.    This  
section will address the inadequacies of the Canadian derivatives regulatory scheme
and  highlight  an  example  of  the  consequences  of  the  insuﬃcient  regulation.

Regulation has Suﬀered due to Uncoordinated Regulation and Implementation
One of the more obvious inadequacies of Canadian derivatives regulation scheme is
the uncoordinated way in which it is carried out. Having multiple, asymmetrical de-‐‑
rivatives  regulation  regimes  has  not  only  created  ineﬃciencies,  but  has  also  provided  
opportunities  for  ﬁnancial  engineers  to  design  instruments  to  carry  out  regulatory  ar-‐‑
bitrage  and  tailor  ﬁnancial  products  that  generate  incredible  yield  at  the  expense  of  the  
public good.140    In  addressing  the  ineﬃcacy  of  uncoordinated  and  unfocused  ﬁnancial  
regulatory  systems,  Henry  Paulson  stated  that  “overlapping  jurisdictions,  gaps  in  juris-‐‑
dictions and authorities, uneven capabilities and competition among [regulators] cre-‐‑
ated  the  environment  in  which  excesses  throughout  the  markets  could  thrive.”141 The
lack  of  coordination  in  the  Canadian  system  has  made  cooperation  with  other  foreign  
national  regulators  diﬃcult,  not  only  as  a  result  of  the  numerous  provincial  interests  
at play, but also because such cooperation is (potentially) constitutionally restricted.142
A  single,  national  regulator  would  be  be er  positioned  to  participate  in  international  
discussions and to guide Canadian derivatives regulation policy development in a di-‐‑
rection  that  is  cohesive  within  the  context  of  other  major  markets.    This  potentiality  is  
of  special  importance  given  the  increasingly  global  nature  of  derivatives  markets.

Inflexible and Outdated Regimes
The  inﬂexible  and  outdated  regulatory  schemes  that  are  in  place  in  Canada  have  le   
OTC derivatives largely unregulated. Whether it is because they do not allow for OTC
derivative instruments to fall under the securities regulatory umbrella, or because the
regime  is  at  ﬁrst  blush  inclusive  but  then  allows  for  blanket  exemptions,  the  outcome  
is  largely  the  same:  participants  in  Canadian  OTC  derivatives  markets  are  essentially  
le   to  their  own  devices.  
Moreover, the evolution of the nature and forms of the derivative instruments and
markets  has  consistently  out-‐‑paced  the  antiquated  legislation  that  is  relied  upon  and  
the  a empts  by  regulators  to  retool  the  regulatory  scheme  in  a  comprehensive  way.    
Take,  for  example,  the  CFAO  in  Ontario,  an  Act  designed  to  regulate  the  forms  of  de-‐‑
rivatives  contracts,  the  marketplaces  through  which  these  contracts  trade,  and  the  par-‐‑
140   Expert Panel on Securities Regulation, supra  note  32  at  55.
141     Henry  Paulson,  “Reform  the  Architecture  of  Regulation”  Financial Times (17 March 2009).
142     Johnston  &  Rockwell,  supra note 118 at 505 – 510.
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ticipants   in   those   marketplaces.    Unfortunately,  since  the  enactment  of  the  CFAO  in  
1978,  there  has  been  signiﬁcant  evolution  in  each  of  these  three  areas,  but  very  few  cor-‐‑
responding  modiﬁcations  in  the  Act.143 Furthermore, the CFAO cannot easily evolve,
because  it  is  tethered  to  a  nascent  conception  of  the  market  that  it  sets  out  to  regulate.    
The  static  deﬁnitions  of  “commodity”,  “commodity  futures  contract”  and  “commodity  
futures  option”  eﬀectively  set  the  boundaries  of  the  CFAO  by  restricting  the  forms  of  
contracts  that  can  be  regulated.    The  deﬁnition  of  a  “commodity  futures  contract”,  for  
example, does not encompass the wide array of derivative products that have come
into existence.144 Today, many derivative instruments derive their value from underly-‐‑
ing variables such as the price of securities or commodities, exchange indices, interest
rates, foreign exchange, electricity, and even weather.145 Put very simply, the types
of  transactions,  the  nature  of  the  market,  and  the  trading  practices  have  evolved  far  
beyond what they were in 1978 and the current CFAO no longer addresses today’s
market.    While  new  regulations  have  been  introduced  in  an  a empt  to  keep  pace,  the  
narrow  deﬁnitions  that  the  Act  provides  do  not  allow  the  Act  to  easily  absorb  changes,  
and  have  allowed  the  state  of  the  regulation  to  lag  signiﬁcantly  behind  the  reality  of  the  
market.146 As was previously discussed, and as was highlighted in the Expert Panel on
Securities  Regulation’s  2009  report,  this  weakness  is  true  not  only  of  the  CFAO,  but  of  
many of the regulatory schemes across Canada.147
Even in provinces where the regulatory regime is relatively modern, the notions be-‐‑
hind   the   provisions   are   o en   outdated.      The   broad   exemptions   for   OTC   derivative  
transactions  in  the  Alberta,  British  Columbia  and  even  Québec  schemes  leave  a  vast  
market  unregulated  and  risk  the  stability  of  the  ﬁnancial  system.    The  dangers  posed  
by  this  lack  of  oversight  have  been  dramatically  demonstrated  through  the  recent  ﬁ-‐‑
nancial downturn.

Damage Caused by an Inadequate Canadian Derivatives Regime
“Highly  leveraged,  lightly  regulated  entities  (e.g.  hedge  funds),  competing  in  largely  
unregulated  OTC  derivatives  markets,  are  an  important  factor  behind  the  global  ﬁnan-‐‑
cial crisis.”148 This pronouncement from the Expert Panel on Securities Regulation is
demonstrative  of  the  growing  concern  over  the  dangers  of  allowing  the  $600  trillion  
global  OTC  derivatives  markets  to  go  unregulated.    The  existence  of  billowing  markets  
for  increasingly  complex  products  has  challenged  our  ﬁnancial  regulatory  system.    As  
became   evident   during   the   non-‐‑bank   ABCP   crisis   in   Canada,   allowing   market   par-‐‑
ticipants trading in OTC derivatives to police themselves has proven to be unsatisfac-‐‑
143     Gro enthaler  &  Henderson,  supra  note  7  at  10-‐‑56  –  10-‐‑61.  See  also  Ontario  Commodity  Futures  
Act  Advisory  Commi ee,  supra note 99 at 15.
144   Ibid. at 11.
145     Mark  R.  Gillen,  Securities Regulation in Canada, 3rd  ed.  (Toronto:  Thomson  Canada  Limited,  2007)  
at  23.
146     Gro enthaler  &  Henderson,  supra  note  7  at  10-‐‑56  –  10-‐‑61.  See  also  Ontario  Commodity  Futures  
Act  Advisory  Commi ee,  supra note 99 at 15.
147   Expert Panel on Securities Regulation, supra  note  32  at  56.
148   Ibid. at 55.
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tory.    In  addition,  the  proliferation  of  oﬀ-‐‑balance-‐‑sheet  entities  (such  as  conduits  and  
structured investment vehicles, which possess the particularly appropriate acronym
of  SIVs)  and  the  rapid  growth  of  highly  complex  ﬁnancial  instruments  further  under-‐‑
mined  the  clarity  of  the  marketplace  and  the  understanding  of  its  participants.149 In his
report to the Expert Panel on Securities Regulation on the causes and implications of
the  ABCP  crisis,  John  Chant  cites  the  nature  of  the  derivative  investments  and  lack  of  
disclosure  thereof  as  primary  catalysts  of  the  ABCP  crisis.150
Chant  notes  that  the  disclosures  made  to  investors  who  purchased  the  ABCP  did  not  
reveal   many   of   the   features   that   ultimately   triggered   the   $32-‐‑billion   market   disrup-‐‑
tion.  He  observes  that  while  the  ﬁnancial  system  is  among  the  most  regulated  indus-‐‑
tries  in  industrialized  economies,  the  participants  in  the  ABCP  market  were  subject  to  
minimal  regulation,  largely  due  to  the  use  of  derivatives  in  the  ABCP  investments.151
Inadequate disclosure of the nature of the investments and contracts that the conduits
were  oﬀering  to  investors  became  a  standard  practice  in  this  essentially  unmonitored  
environment. For instance, the disclosure memoranda that were distributed to in-‐‑
vestors made only passing reference to the possibility of investment in credit deriva-‐‑
tives  and  no  mention  at  all  of  the  risks  inherent  in  being  exposed  to  such  high  levels  
of leverage through those instruments.152      Speciﬁcally,   Chant   cites   the   lack   of   sound  
se lement,   legal   and   operational   infrastructure   in   the   OTC   derivatives   markets   as   a  
potential  source  of  weakness  in  Canada’s  ﬁnancial  system.153    The  risk  assumption  and  
leverage  of  the  institutions  that  trade  in  derivative  products  must  be  more  eﬀectively  
monitored   and   regulated   to   achieve   a   more   appropriate   balance   between   eﬃciency,  
conﬁdentiality,  stability  and  fairness  to  investors  in  Canada’s  derivative  markets.    At  
present,   the   balance   seems   to   be   shi ed   too   far   to   the   conﬁdentiality   and   eﬃciency  
side,  providing  insuﬃcient  amounts  of  investor  protection  and  stability.  

III. RESHAPING THE REGULATION OF CANADA’S DERIVATIVE MARKETS
Whether   the   beneﬁts   of   the   growth   of   derivatives   markets   can   be   fully   realized   de-‐‑
pends   on   how   markets   address   the   various   ﬁnancial   stability   and   risk-‐‑management  
issues posed by the use of these instruments. The decentralized, disorganized and out-‐‑
dated  group  of  laws  that  are  tasked  with  regulating  the  Canadian  markets  for  deriva-‐‑
tive  ﬁnancial  products  does  not  eﬃciently  or  eﬀectively  address  these  issues.    In  light  
of  the  challenges  posed  by  the  rapidly  evolving  derivatives  markets  and  the  increas-‐‑
ingly global economy, the current system is no longer tenable and a reshaping of the
149     Congressional  Oversight  Panel,  “Modernizing  the  American  Financial  Regulatory  System:  
Recommendations for Improving Oversight, Protecting Consumers, and Ensuring Stability”
(Washington  D.C.:  Special  Report  on  Regulatory  Reform,  January  2009)  at  14.
150 Chant, supra  note  33  at  4.
151 Ibid. at 11.
152 Ibid.  at  10.  The  only  mention  of  investment  in  credit  derivatives  was  the  inclusion  of  “credit  
instruments” among the list of possible ownership interests for the trust.
153   Ibid. at 28.
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regulatory  scheme  is  necessary.    A  dedicated,  ﬂexible,  consolidated  and  modernized  
regulatory  system  will  be er  serve  investors  and  businesses  and  be  a  more  eﬀective  
guardian of the health of the Canadian economy. This section will provide a broad
strokes  outline  for  what  the  reforma ed  Canadian  system  for  derivatives  regulation  
should  encompass  in  order  to  combat  some  of  the  weaknesses  that  were  addressed  in  
the previous section.

1. Separate Derivatives Act
What  would  the  optimal  derivative  markets  regulation  legislation  look  like?  The  opti-‐‑
mal  regulatory  regime  for  Canada’s  derivative  markets  would  be  speciﬁcally  focused  
on  derivative  instruments.    Despite  the  fact  that  derivatives  evoke  many  of  the  same  
fears that securities trigger, many derivatives cannot accurately be characterized as
securities,  nor  do  they  share  the  same  properties,  purposes,  or  risks.    Regulating  them  
as  if  they  were  securities  risks  not  only  over-‐‑regulating,  but  also  leaving  the  most  dan-‐‑
gerous  aspects  of  derivatives  markets  unchecked.
A  dedicated  piece  of  derivatives  legislation  would  regulate  both  exchange-‐‑traded  de-‐‑
rivatives  and  OTC  derivatives,  albeit  dealing  with  and  deﬁning  those  markets  in  dif-‐‑
ferent  ways.    As  discussed  above,  certain  OTC  derivatives  will  likely  continue  to  meet  
the  deﬁnition  of  security.    Thus,  the  Act  would  need  to  function  alongside  the  securi-‐‑
ties regulation scheme (with both regimes operating at a federal level under preferred
circumstances), with the two regimes being as compatible as possible. The regime that
Québec  has  put  in  place  would  seem  to  be  well  positioned  to  deal  with  this  problem,  
and should be broadly adopted.
Of course, there are disadvantages to having two separate regulatory schemes. First,
while the two pieces of legislation may start out being relatively consistent, over time
inconsistent or contradictory provisions may arise. Second, there can be uncertainty
with respect to the treatment of products that straddle two regimes. Third, overlap-‐‑
ping  jurisdictions  can  provide  opportunities  for  legal  arbitrage,  with  issuers  and  oﬀer-‐‑
ors  choosing  the  more  beneﬁcial  regime.    Fourth,  administering  two  separate  regimes  
may result in increased costs of regulation.
However,  these  criticisms  are  not  entirely  forceful  and  applicable.    If  a  principles-‐‑based  
approach  is  taken  (as  will  be  explained,  below),  then  the  various  pieces  of  regulatory  leg-‐‑
islation  are  likely  to  remain  cohesive,  as  the  outcomes  will  be  the  same.    The  regulatory  
arbitrage  problem  is  similarly  countered  by  employing  a  principles-‐‑based  approach.    
As  for  the  uncertainty  that  may  be  created  regarding  the  use  of  ﬁnancial  products  that  
straddle  the  deﬁnition,  while  not  perfect,  it  is  likely  that  Québec’s  approach  will  ad-‐‑
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equately deal with this problem.154 If nothing else, the new regime would be more cer-‐‑
tain than the existing regimes. The only disadvantage that remains is increased cost.
However, this criticism of the separate regime approach also seems largely unfounded,
as, for most participants, having a separate regime actually increases certainty, which
in turn lowers costs for both the participant and the regulator. Similarly, avoiding
costly  market  disruptions  and  bailouts  justiﬁes  increased  expenditure.
On balance, treating derivatives as separate from securities, with rules and regulations
that  recognize  the  unique  aspects  of  both  exchange-‐‑traded  and  OTC  derivatives,  will  
allow  the  government  to  be er  meet  the  objective  of  ﬂexibility  within  an  eﬃcient  and  
sound  marketplace.    It  would  be  wise  to  follow  the  lead  of  Québec  on  this  structural  
ma er.    While  the  QDA  is  hardly  a  perfect  piece  of  legislation,  recognizing  that  deriva-‐‑
tives  markets  require  a  dedicated  piece  of  legislation  takes  a  signiﬁcant  step  toward  
creating  certainty,  eﬃciency,  eﬃcacy,  and  stability  for  the  beneﬁt  of  market  participants,  
and  more  generally,  for  the  beneﬁt  of  the  Canadian  ﬁnancial  system  as  a  whole.

2. Principles-Based System
Ought  the  derivatives  regulation  scheme  to  be  shi ed  toward  a  more  principles-‐‑based  
approach?  The  unprecedented  increase  in  size  of  the  Canadian  and  global  derivatives  
markets,  while  providing  beneﬁts  to  users,  also  created  exposures  that  threatened  the  
stability  of  the  entire  ﬁnancial  system.    The  fast  pace  at  which  innovations  are  turned  
out  in  derivatives  markets,  and  especially  in  OTC  derivatives  markets,  has  foiled  regu-‐‑
lators  in  Canada  who  rely  on  static,  largely  rules-‐‑based  systems  to  keep  pace.155
A regulatory system should be designed such that regulators can readily adapt to mar-‐‑
ket  innovations  and  changes,  and  it  should  include  a  formal  mechanism  for  evaluat-‐‑
ing  the  full  potential  range  of  risks  that  new  products  and  services  pose  to  the  market  
participants, customers, and the economy as a whole. Commentators both in Canada
and  abroad  are  increasingly  recommending  principles-‐‑based  regulation  as  a  formula  
that  oﬀers  this  ability  to  adapt  and  evolve.156    As  Henry  Paulson  articulated,  “a  regula-‐‑
tory  structure  organised  by  objective  is  far  more  likely  to  withstand  the  test  of  time.    
In   an   objectives-‐‑based   model   no   business   can   change   regulator   simply   by   changing  
form.”157

154     The  concept  of  a  “hybrid  product”  is  incorporated  into  the  QDA  to  eliminate  any  legal  uncer-‐‑
tainty in the regulatory characterization of structured securities products with embedded derivatives.
The  hybrid  product  test  under  the  QDA  seeks  to  establish  whether  any  given  instrument  can  be  “pre-‐‑
sumed  to  be  predominantly  a  security.”  The  presumption  applies:  1)  if  the  oﬀeror  receives  payment  
of  the  purchase  price  upon  delivery  of  the  product;  2)  if  the  purchaser  is  under  no  obligation  to  make  
any payment in addition to the purchase price during the term of the product or at maturity (such
as  a  margin  deposit,  margin,  se lement);  and  3)  if  the  terms  of  the  instrument  do  not  include  margin  
requirements  based  on  a  market  value  of  the  underlying  interest.
155 Expert Panel on Securities Regulation, supra  note  32  at  19  and  21.
156   Ibid. at 17. See also Congressional Oversight Panel, supra  note  149  at  54.
157 Paulson, supra  note  141  at  2.
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However,  although  principles-‐‑based  systems  are  gaining  in  popularity,  there  are  many  
voices  in  the  business  community  arguing  that  principles-‐‑based  regulation  of  the  ﬁ-‐‑
nancial   markets   is   unpredictable,   disruptive,   and   unfair.158 Those being regulated
want  clear  rules  that  create  certainty  about  what  can  and  cannot  be  done.    An  a ack  on  
the  principles-‐‑based  model  is  that  it  is  likely  to  descend  into  “regulation  by  enforce-‐‑
ment,” meaning that regulatory norms will be established ex post through enforcement
actions  rather  than  through  preemptive  rulemaking.159 Similarly, some argue that prin-‐‑
ciples-‐‑based  systems  lack  uniformity  of  application  as  circumstances,  rather  than  ac-‐‑
tions, will play a larger role in determining outcomes.160 This possibility could reduce
both  the  regulatory  certainty  for  market  participants  and  the  perception  of  fairness.161
Furthermore, there is a general concern that the regulatory burden on businesses may
actually increase due to the need to develop and monitor internal compliance controls
to achieve the desired regulatory outcome. These conditions could lead to a situation
wherein  parties  with  suﬃcient  resources  will  seek  to  gain  by  a empting  to  manipulate  
and exploit the uncertainty of the system, contest the application of a principle, and en-‐‑
gage  in  risky  or  borderline  behavior.    Some  commentators  thus  argue  that  enforcement  
costs   under   principles-‐‑based   systems   skyrocket   as   regulators   struggle   to   deﬁne   the  
boundaries  of  appropriate  behavior  and  ﬁt  recalcitrant  subjects  within  an  ill-‐‑deﬁned  
rubric.162      Evidently,   principles-‐‑based   systems   have   potential   drawbacks.      However,  
these  weaknesses  are  tempered  by  the  countervailing  advantages  that  principles-‐‑based  
systems  oﬀer.
While neither system is always preferable to the other, the unique challenges posed
by  the  derivatives  markets  require  a  nuanced  and  adaptive  approach.    By  mandating  
outcomes  rather  than  prescribing  processes,  principles-‐‑based  systems  allow  for  more  
ﬂexibility  in  compliance  than  rigid  rules-‐‑based  systems.    Rules,  while  certain,  can  be  
over-‐‑  or  under-‐‑  inclusive,  and  can  thereby  encourage  socially  undesirable  behavior  up  
to the line that the rule articulates.163    Similarly,  it  is  o en  desirable  for  rules  –  especially  
rules  regulating  rapidly  evolving  areas  such  as  the  derivatives  markets  –  to  evolve  over  
time  in  order  to  keep  pace  with  social  norms  and  new  realities.    Rules-‐‑based  systems  
are   much   less   amenable   to   alteration   than   are   principles-‐‑based   systems,   which   pos-‐‑
sess  ﬂexible  foundations  that  can  bend  to  incorporate  revisions  in  theory  and  tactics.164
Moreover,  as  Lawrence  Cunningham  aptly  points  out,  the  use  of  the  word  “based”  is  
demonstrative,  as  most  systems  are  really  a  combination  of  the  two  frameworks.165

158    James  J.  Park,  “The  Competing  Paradigms  of  Securities  Regulation”  (2007-‐‑2008)  57  Duke  L.J.  625  
at  662.
159 Ibid.  at  631.
160     John  C.  Coﬀee,  Jr.  &  Hillary  A  Sale,  “Redesigning  the  SEC:  Does  the  Treasury  Have  a  Be er  
Idea?”  (2009)  95  Va.  L.  Rev.  707  at  752.
161   Expert Panel on Canadian Securities Regulation, supra  note  32  at  18.
162     Louis  Kaplow,  “Rules  Versus  Standards:  An  Economic  Analysis”  42  Duke.  L.J.  557  at  562.
163     Coﬀee  &  Sale,  supra  note  160  at  751.
164   Ibid. at 752.
165     Lawrence  A.  Cunningham,  “A  Prescription  to  Retire  the  Rhetoric  of  ‘Principles-‐‑Based  Systems’  in  
Corporate  Law,  Securities  Regulation  and  Accounting”  (2007)  60  Vand.  L.  Rev.  1411  at  1413.
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In  this  regard,  the  British  Columbia  Securities  Commission’s  eﬀorts  provide  a  suitable  
model  for  consideration.    British  Columbia  has  been  developing  an  “outcomes-‐‑based”  
approach to securities regulation, the umbrella under which it includes derivatives
regulation.166      The   purpose   of   principles-‐‑based   regulation   is   not   to   entirely   replace  
rules with principles or to leave businesses to their own devices without guidance or
oversight. In fact, it would be unwise to have a regulatory system that was entirely
grounded   upon   either   the   rules-‐‑based   or   principles-‐‑based   approach.      Indeed,   some  
prescription  in  the  rules  is  sometimes  necessary  and  desirable;  black  and  white  cases  
must  be  treated  as  such.    That  said,  a  bright-‐‑line  approach  may  not  be  the  most  eﬃcient  
or  eﬀective  tactic  in  all  situations.    The  stance  that  British  Columbia  has  taken  is  that  
regulators  will  intervene  less,  and  will  instead  work  more  with  businesses  by  encour-‐‑
aging  them  to  do  the  “right  thing”  in  whatever  manner  they  ﬁnd  to  be  most  eﬃcient  
and   eﬀective,   in   order   to   achieve   desired   regulatory   outcomes.167      Thus,   principles-‐‑
based  regulation  establishes  high-‐‑level  principles  for  business  conduct  that  articulate  
desired   regulatory   outcomes.      Businesses   are   given   greater   freedom   to   develop   and  
manage internal compliance systems to achieve those outcomes. The role of the regu-‐‑
lator  in  a  principles-‐‑based  system  shi s  from  that  of  enforcer  to  more  of  a  partner  who  
works  with  businesses  to  provide  guidance  on  appropriate  regulatory  practices.168
In  addition  to  injecting  ﬂexibility  for  market  participants,  a  principles-‐‑based  system  of  
regulating  the  Canadian  derivatives  markets  would  allow  for  more  cohesion  in  the  na-‐‑
tional  ﬁnancial  regulatory  system  by  regulating  the  ends  rather  than  the  means.    This  
approach   would   provide   be er   protection   against   ﬁnancial   engineers   ﬁnding   loop-‐‑
holes and exploiting the rigidities of the system to the detriment of the public welfare.
In  general,  a  more  principles-‐‑based  approach  is  thought  to  be  an  appropriate  response  
to the current derivatives regulatory environment that many believe has become too
heavily reliant on rules and too focused on the process to the detriment of the ultimate
regulatory outcomes.169    As  OTC  derivatives  can  take  almost  any  contractual  form  and  
synthesize  almost  any  kind  of  economic  act,  the  possible  evolutions  are  endless.    Such  
instruments demand a form of regulation that is calibrated to respond based on what
they do, not on what they are called.170
Worries  about  the  principles-‐‑based  approach  are  not  unfounded  and  deserve  careful  
consideration.    Taking  these  concerns  into  account  will  require  a  balancing  of  the  need  
for  some  rules  to  ensure  that  suﬃcient  certainty  and  eﬃciency  are  present,  with  the  
desire  to  build  on  principles.    If  this  can  be  accomplished,  the  creation  of  an  eﬀective  
and  ﬂexible  derivatives  regulation  scheme  will  be  both  possible  and  desirable.    Henry  
Paulson  wrote  that,  “The  ideal  regulatory  structure  would  reﬂect  the  reasons  we  regu-‐‑
late   and   would   recognize   that   the   ﬁnancial   system   has   changed   dramatically   since  
166     “Outcomes-‐‑based”  is  the  label  that  BC  legislators  believe  more  properly  describes  the  ends-‐‑fo-‐‑
cused  foundation  of  principles-‐‑based  regulation.
167   Expert Panel on Securities Regulation, supra  note  32  at  18.
168   Ibid. at 17.
169   Ibid.
170 Congressional Oversight Panel, supra  note  149  at  29.
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our regulatory architecture was designed.”171      Using   a   principles-‐‑based   system   as   a  
foundation, it may be possible to realize a regulatory architecture that evolves with the
market.    The  diﬃculty  will  lie  in  ﬁnding  a  balance  between  certainty  and  ﬂexibility.

3. Structuring the Substantive Content of the Regime – Evolving Ideology
The   current   crisis   has   exposed   serious   ﬂaws   in   many   aspects   of   our  
ﬁnancial  system…[w]e  will  need  to  reﬂect  on  the  long-‐‑held  promise  that  
sophisticated   investors   have   the   wherewithal   to   look   out   for   themselves  
and require minimal, if any, supervision.172
Henry Paulson’s statement challenges the current Canadian practice of allowing broad
exemptions  from  most  manifestations  of  derivatives  regulation  to  the  “sophisticated”  
class  of  investors,  comprised  mainly  of  ﬁnancial  institutions,  large  companies  and  high  
net-‐‑worth  individuals.
The current Canadian practice is based upon what was, up until recently, a widely
accepted   view   of   how   OTC   markets   ought   to   be   regulated.      This   ideology   was   well  
articulated  by  former  Federal  Reserve  Chairman,  Alan  Greenspan:
By  design,  this  market,  presumed  to  involve  dealings  among  sophisticated  
professionals, has been largely exempt from government regulation. In
part,  this  exemption  reﬂects  the  view  that  professionals  do  not  require  the  
investor  protections  commonly  aﬀorded  to  markets  in  which  retail  investors  
participate.  But  regulation  is  not  only  unnecessary  in  these  markets,  it  is  
potentially damaging, because regulation presupposes disclosure and
forced disclosure of proprietary information can undercut innovations in
ﬁnancial  markets  just  as  it  would  in  real  estate  markets.173
But  having  witnessed  the  devastation  that  can  result  from  irresponsible  economic  prac-‐‑
tices  through  the  market  meltdown  in  2008,  perhaps  the  traditional  mantra  of  trading  
oﬀ  stability  and  investor  protection  to  allow  for  unbridled  eﬃciency  and  freedom  for  
market  actors  deserves  revisiting.  
In  April  2008,  former  Federal  Reserve  Chairman,  Paul  Volcker,  commented  on  these  
developments  in  a  speech  to  the  Economic  Club  of  New  York:
[T]he  sheer  complexity,  opaqueness,  and  systemic  risks  embedded  in  the  
new   markets   –   complexities   and   risks   li le   understood   even   by   most   of  
those with management responsibilities – has enormously complicated both
oﬃcial  and  private  responses  to  this  current  mother  of  all  crises…  [s]imply  
stated,  the  bright  new  ﬁnancial  system  –  for  all  its  talented  participants,  for  
171 Paulson, supra  note  141  at  2.
172 Ibid. at 1.
173   Congressional Oversight Panel, supra  note  149  at  15.
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all  its  rich  rewards  –  has  failed  the  test  of  the  market  place…[.]174
Given  that  the  consequences  of  allowing  the  arcane  realm  of  OTC  derivatives  and  so-‐‑
phisticated  market  participants  to  go  unregulated  have  become  so  real  and  the  risks  
now so apparent, new measures to improve transparency in the derivatives regula-‐‑
tory  system  must  be  implemented.    Lack  of  transparency  in  this  shadowy  area  of  the  
ﬁnancial  system  contributed  to  failures  in  risk  management  and  diﬃculty  in  pricing  
assets  and  assessing  the  health  of  ﬁnancial  institutions.    However,  there  are  potential  
solutions. Transparency can be enhanced in several ways. Some of the more promising
options include standardization of derivative products, establishment of clearinghous-‐‑
es   for   both   exchange-‐‑traded   and   OTC   derivative   transactions   and   enhanced   public  
reporting requirements.
Increasing  the  uniformity  of  derivative  instruments  would  allow  the  market  to  more  
readily and accurately compare instruments of a similar nature, thereby promoting
openness and competition, and improving liquidity.175 Similarly, the development and
implementation of central clearinghouses may help to insulate parties from counter-‐‑
party  risk,  increase  transparency  and  improve  liquidity.    Clearinghouses  act  as  inter-‐‑
mediaries between the transacting parties, such that the original trade is converted into
two new trades where the clearinghouse becomes the buyer to the original seller and
the  seller  to  the  original  buyer.    They  also  provide  clearance  and  se lement  services  
with  respect  to  derivative  instruments.    But  in  insulating  the  parties  from  the  coun-‐‑
terparty   risk   inherent   in   derivative   transactions,   clearinghouses   take   on   credit   risk.    
One method for providing the clearinghouse with adequate capital in case of default
involves  taking  the  “margin”  to  secure  performance  of  each  trade.176 Other methods
include  daily  marks-‐‑to-‐‑market  to  reduce  risk  arising  from  price  ﬂuctuations  in  the  val-‐‑
ue of the contract, or guaranty funds, into which each of the members of the clearing-‐‑
house puts up a deposit to cover its future liabilities.177 These characteristics facilitate
inspection by the regulator and public reporting of prices and volumes, which pro-‐‑
duces  the  additional  beneﬁts  of  increased  liquidity  and  price  transparency.178 Thus, in
conjunction with the standardization of derivatives contracts, clearinghouses have the
potential  to  add  predictability,  stability,  and,  arguably,  eﬃciency  to  the  system.  
Another option is to institute public reporting requirements to increase transparency.
While  some  forms  of  derivatives,  such  as  exchange-‐‑traded  derivatives,  are  regulated  
through   the   securities  or  ﬁnancial  regimes,  most  fall  into  the  exempt   market  due  to  
the sophistication of the parties, or are subject to no regulation at all.179 This reality
means   that   o en   neither   party   to   a   transaction   has   any   obligation   to   disclose   mate-‐‑
174   Ibid. at 20.
175 Unterman, supra  note  24  at  94.
176   Philip R. Wood,  Set-‐‑oﬀ  and  Ne ing,  Derivatives,  Clearing  Systems,  2nd  ed.  (London:  Sweet  &  
Maxwell Limited, 2007) at 100.
177 Ibid. at 215.
178 Ibid.  at  214.
179 Sarra, supra  note  2  at  455.

Vol.  19    

Dalhousie  Journal  of  Legal  Studies    

61

rial  adverse  risks  associated  with  the  derivative  instrument,  and  can  leave  unknowing  
parties  overexposed  to  risk.    Regulators  are  beginning  to  address  the  issues  of  trans-‐‑
parency through the addition of heightened disclosure requirements in securities and
ﬁnancial  regulation.180 In the United States, former SEC Chairman Christopher Cox
proposed  requiring  derivatives  market  participants,  speciﬁcally  in  the  complex  OTC  
derivatives  markets,  to  adhere  to  a  public  disclosure  regime  that  would  allow  regula-‐‑
tors  to  monitor  market  risk  and  potential  market  abuse.    Cox’s  proposals  include  man-‐‑
dating the publication of reports of OTC transactions to improve transparency and
pricing,  and  reporting  derivatives  positions  that  aﬀect  public  securities  to  the  regula-‐‑
tor.181      In   Canada,   the   Canadian   Securities  Administrators   have   proposed   NI   55-‐‑104  
Insider Reporting Requirements and Exemptions  in  an  eﬀort  to  provide  the  market  with  
information  that  could  allow  investors  to  make  their  own  determinations  as  to  whether  
the  reported  holdings  of  an  entity  reﬂect  its  true  economic  position.182    In  Québec,  the  
implementation  of  the  QDA  represents  another  promising  step  in  this  direction;  how-‐‑
ever,  the  level  of  transparency  ought  to  be  increased  so  that  “sophisticated”  investors  
are  not  able  to  slip  so  easily  through  the  cracks.  
Do  these  options  present  desirable  trade-‐‑oﬀs  between  providing  investor  protection  
and   promoting   the   eﬃciency   and   vitality   of   the   markets?   None   of   these   solutions  
represents a silver bullet, since in standardizing derivative instruments, mandating
the use of clearinghouses and regulating certain levels of disclosure, many of the ef-‐‑
ﬁciencies  that  make  derivatives  desirable  may  be  lost.183 To answer this question, it is
necessary   to   distinguish   between   two   diﬀerent   types   of   ﬁnancial   innovation.      Many  
innovations  in  ﬁnancial  markets  have  been  eﬃciency-‐‑improving  in  that  they  have  re-‐‑
duced  the  costs  or  risks  of  ﬁnancial  transactions.    Others,  however,  have  been  merely  
regulation-‐‑avoiding,   creating   new   types   of   transactions   that   lie   outside   the   scope   of  
prevailing regulation.184    Eﬃciency-‐‑increasing  innovations  beneﬁt  both  users  and  sup-‐‑
pliers  of  funds.  However,  praise  for  regulation-‐‑avoiding  innovations  should  be  more  
sparing. In some cases, these sorts of innovations have allowed for the emergence of
new products that avoid the costs of inappropriate or excessive regulation. In other
cases,  regulation-‐‑avoiding  innovation  has  simply  exploited  loopholes  in  the  ﬁnancial  
regulatory system and triggered unfortunate consequences.
In establishing the goals of regulation, we ought to ensure that we are not pushing ef-‐‑
ﬁciency  simply  for  its  own  sake.    Eﬃciency  that  results  in  only  short-‐‑term  economic  
gains  and  risks  market  disruption  or  even  systemic  breakdown  can  no  longer  be  tol-‐‑
erated. Designing an appropriate regime will involve balancing the costs and ben-‐‑
eﬁts  of  allowing  participants  freedom  in  the  derivatives  markets.    Old  ideologies  that  
180 Ibid.  at  465-‐‑467.
181 Congressional Oversight Panel, supra  note  149  at  20.
182 Sarra, supra  note  2  at  468.  Proposed  NI  55-‐‑104  Insider Reporting Requirements and Exemptions, to be
in  eﬀect  31  December  2010,  is  targeted  at  making  it  easier  for  issuers  and  insiders  to  understand  and  
comply with their obligations through the harmonization of disclosure requirements, in addition to
making  it  easier  for  other  market  participants  to  analyze  the  reported  information.
183   Unterman, supra  note  24  at  93-‐‑95.
184   Chant, supra  note  33  at  45.
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justify   allowing   “sophisticated”   market   participants   to   be   largely   unregulated   must  
be  abandoned,  and  the  opaque  elements  of  the  ﬁnancial  system  must  be  exposed  to  
sunlight and disinfected through increased transparency. Despite the added cost and
the  potential  for  decreased  eﬃciency  that  these  new  measures  may  impose,  in  light  of  
the   systemic   breakdown   that   previously   lax   regulations   catalyzed,   there   is   no   other  
rational option but to question our old assumptions.

4. Consolidated National Regulator
The optimal Canadian derivatives regulatory regime would be an element of a larger
market  regulation  scheme  that  engages  in  eﬃcient  oversight  of  the  securities  and  ﬁ-‐‑
nancial  markets  by  eliminating  the  fragmented  provincial  system,  focusing  on  a  com-‐‑
mon  ﬁnancial  regulatory  mission,  and  minimizing  the  regulatory  burden  while  eﬀec-‐‑
tively achieving the goals of regulation. This regulator would ideally administer a
national   principles-‐‑based   Derivatives  Act,   in   addition   to   administering   the   national  
securities  regulation  regime  to  ensure  that  there  were  no  eﬃciency  losses  or  inconsis-‐‑
tency where the two regimes bordered each other. Moreover, as Canadian derivatives
markets  become  increasingly  globally  oriented,  it  will  be  become  even  more  important  
for Canadian regulators to be able to coordinate with foreign counterparts. A national
Canadian  regulator  will  be  be er  positioned  to  coordinate  internationally  with  other  
regulators than a single provincial regulator would be.185
It   seems   as   though,   a er   years   of   discussion   and   deliberation,   the   Government   of  
Canada  may  be  moving  in  this  direction.    The  Government  of  Canada’s  2009  budget,  
entitled Canada’s Economic Plan and released on January 27, 2009, suggests that the
federal government is prepared to press ahead with this new federal approach to se-‐‑
curities regulation.186 It is beyond the scope of this article to consider the question of
whether a national regulator is possible, and only time will tell if this initiative is able
to overcome the political and constitutional obstacles that have sidelined previous at-‐‑
tempts.187    Suﬃce  it  to  say  that  the  regulation  of  derivatives  markets  in  Canada  would  
surely  beneﬁt  from  a  consolidated  national  derivatives  regulation  regime.

CONCLUSION
A review of the Canadian derivatives regulation landscape has demonstrated that sub-‐‑
stantial asymmetries exist between provinces and that many of the regimes in place
were never intended to regulate the complex forms of derivative instruments that have
185    Wise  Persons’  Commi ee  to  Review  the  Structure  of  Securities  Regulation  in  Canada,  It’s Time
(O awa:  Department  of  Finance,  2003)  at  67–68.
186   Department of Finance, Canada’s Economic Plan (O awa:  Department  of  Finance  Canada,  2009)  at  
87.
187    Mary  Condon,  Anita  Anand  &  Janis  Sarra, Securities Law in Canada (Toronto: Emond
Montgomery  Publications  Limited,  2005)  at  65–75.  See  also  Stephen  P.  Sibold,  “Assessing  Canada’s  
Regulatory  Response  to  the  Sarbanes-‐‑Oxley  Act  of  2002:  Lessons  for  Canadian  Policy  Makers”  (2009)  
46  Alta.  L.  Rev.  769  at  778–782.
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proliferated   throughout   the   Canadian   and   global   derivatives   markets.      While   pro-‐‑
vincial  regulators  have  a empted  to  cope  with  this  reality  through  the  enactment  of  
amendments, reformulations and even entirely new legislation, the derivatives regula-‐‑
tion scheme in Canada remains unsatisfactory. It is time that we invested in a dedicat-‐‑
ed piece of derivatives legislation based on principles that will allow it to adapt rather
than to be made obsolete. It is time that we dropped old ideologies in favour of a new
approach   that   values   not   only   eﬃciency,   but   fairness   and   macro-‐‑stability.      With   the  
federal government pushing forward legislation that would see a national securities
regulator  created,  perhaps  now  is  the  time  to  make  these  changes.    As  always,  unfortu-‐‑
nately, the devil will be in the details.

